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ABSTRACT 
Until lawmakers harmonize the relationship between copyright owners and users within the context of 
software copyright, it will remain a controversial topic within the legal field. The ongoing conflict of 
interests between copyright owners and users along with the increasing complexities of technology 
make the situation of software copyright more complicated. It is something that the doctrine of fair 
use/dealing aims to stabilize. In the past few decades, the doctrine of fair use/dealing has evolved 
towards more complex recording and sharing tools, such as the peer-to-peer networks. However, the 
court rulings that involve fair use/dealing in software copyright cases contain many inconsistencies. 
Many of these inconsistencies are caused by the continuous enforcement of software copying 
restrictions, which have made software copying acts that used to be fair as, instead, copyright 
infringements. In addition, the test that determines the fairness of copying acts contains some 
ambiguities. Nevertheless, fair use/dealing has achieved some balance in terms of the legal powers 
between copyright owners and users and to preserves, to some extent, copyright’s true purpose, which 
is to maintain the flow of knowledge and information through proper promotion and dissemination not 
only to protect the interests of copyright owners. Furthermore, cases related to software copyright prove 
that the law should not stand in the way of technological progress or to enact laws that impede its 
function. Instead, law should guide technology to a safe path that guarantees the best of interests for 
all parties. This paper argues that reconciling the fair use/dealing with interests of copyright owners and 
users should be based on examining the interaction between users and authors and its impact on the 
community at large instead of determining the legitimacy of the consumers’ use. This path will require 
a mechanism that properly weighs the needs and interests of both the copyright owners and users. A 
mechanism that includes contribution, alternate modes of dissemination, technological neutrality, and 
proportionality stricto sensu is a capable tool for such cases. 
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I. Introduction 
When I was 11 years old, I asked my older brother whether downloading video games were 
haram, forbidden, or halal, allowed, in Islam. His answer was that it was a difficult question 
that I should not overthink it and that I should just play the games, and so I did. However, after 
several years, I started to give this question a second thought, especially after reading many 
articles that discuss the issue of software copying. During my random readings, I read about 
the principle of fair use/dealing for the first time. Out of curiosity, I started to look into this 
principle, and the more I read about it the more my curiosity was aroused and the complexity 
of my questions apparent. I explored both of the extremes. The opponents and the supporters 
of fair use/dealing, but it did not help me to answer my question of whether I, too, was a pirate? 
In my current research, I gathered my personal, professional, and academic experiences 
together in an attempt to address such a question. And while this paper does not directly answer 
the questions that I and many others have, rather, it is to identify a method or set of tools that 
will help in providing a resolution to these questions. 
Software copying1 is a topic that remains controversial within intellectual property (hereinafter 
IP) law due to the conflict of interests between copyright owners and users. The former aim to 
control the reproduction or copying of their content, while the latter seek to access such content 
regardless of the restrictions.2 Such a conflict of interests requires a balanced system so that 
copyright owners do not impinge on users’ access to protected content and users can benefit 
from their access without affecting the incentive of copyright owners. The problem is that 
lawmakers’ attempts to achieve the required balance between copyright owners and users’ 
rights have not lessened the complexity of software copying and its impact on IP rights due to 
 
1 Software copying is the act of obtaining a software from a different source without the permission of the 
copyright holder. It is also called the secondary use of a copyrighted software. For this project, the term software 
is being used for all intangible content that are associated with hardware. See Merriam-Webster, Definition of 
Software, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/software. 
2 See Anandashankar Mazumda, Is Copying Ever OK? Software Practices on Line in Copyright Case (Dec. 2017), 
available at https://biglawbusiness.com/is-copying-ever-ok-software-practices-on-line-in-copyright-case/. This 
article reflects on the topic of interoperability, which is a term used to describe the communication between 
hardware and software in order to make a useable system or device. The article focuses on the case of Oracle 
America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 17-1118 (Fed. Cir. 2018), which the Federal Circuit recently remanded the case 
to the lower district court, while Google filed a petition to the Supreme Court to hear the case in order to 
determine whether APIs (application programming interfaces) that are used for interoperability purposes are 
copyrightable. In this case, the Federal Circuit found that Google’s act in copying the codes of Java into their 
Android operating system is not fair use as the copying act was for commercial purposes, non-transformative, 
and not minimal. The article was written before the Federal Circuit’s verdict. However, the future of 
interoperability in issues of software copying is still not definitive as the Supreme Court is yet to render its 
decision. 
2 
the increasing restrictions on accessing software content.3 In addition, many states and multi-
national companies hide the true nature of software copying, and try to stop any efforts that 
would make software copying a legitimate act. They do this by imposing restrictive measures 
on accessing copyrighted content based on the perception that “copying without the payment 
of a fee raises a specter of a lost opportunity for additional profit.”4 The complexities that 
surround software copying in IP law make the application of the doctrine of fair use5 or fair 
dealing6 quite challenging due to the process of balancing between two conflicting sets of 
interests. 
The problem of achieving balance in fair use began way before even the emergence of software 
copying itself. The very first modern copyright law, which is the Statute of Anne, was passed 
by the English Parliament between 1709 and 1710. The Statute was mainly an attempt to 
restrain the monopoly of publishers by limiting the indefinite copyright term that existed before 
the enactment of the Statute. Instead, it had a fixed term of 14 years subject to renewal by the 
author,7 so publishers were no longer able to own the publishing rights of the authors’ content 
indefinitely. However, publishers viewed this Statute as not within their best interest, so they 
managed to convince the Parliament that copyright protects the author’s creation under natural 
law in order to limit the abridgments or copying of published content. In this way they made it 
about the authors’ and publishers’ interests through these rights,8 which, later on, caused a 
debate amongst legal practitioners. There are parties who saw the Statute as a regulation that 
protected authors and publishers from users, while others realized that its real objective was to 
 
3 See Leslie Harris, PIPA / SOPA and the Online Tsunami: A First Draft of the Future (Feb 2012), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/pipa-sopa-online-tsunami-draft-future/story?id=15500925. PIPA (Protect 
IP Act) and SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) were proposed regulations in the US Congress that aimed to impose 
more restrictive and takedown measures for copyright infringements over the internet. After intense protests, 
the two bills were postponed indefinitely. 
4  LAYMAN PATTERSON, UNDERSTANDING FAIR USE, 263 (1992). This statement reflects the irrelevance of 
measuring the copyrighted matter with an economic harm as such norm can lead to inexistent or non-factual 
financial impact. 
5 Fair use is a doctrine in the law of the US that permits the act of using a protected content without violating 
the IP rights of the creator. It is incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976 under section 107. 
6 Fair dealing is the equivalent to the US doctrine of fair use. Fair dealing is found in many of the common law 
jurisdictions of the Commonwealth of Nations like Canada. 
7 LYMAN PATTERSON ET. AL., THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 27-33 (1991). Acquiring a 
general knowledge about the legal history of copyright can reveal the turning points that caused imbalances 
between the public interest of users and private interest of copyright owners. 
8 Id. at 45. 
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protect the public from the publishers’ excessive control over the market in order to create a 
safer environment for accessing knowledge and information.9 
Although the Statute of Anne did not manage to fully achieve its real objective, a case followed 
which made it clear that copyright was not just about the rights of authors and publishers. In 
1740, the Court of Chancery managed to establish the doctrine of "fair abridgement" in Gyles 
v. Wilcox (hereinafter Gyles) in England.10 The case was primarily related to whether the act 
of copying a published book leads to an infringement of the author’s rights or not. In this case, 
the Court established the doctrine of fair abridgment. This doctrine permitted the unauthorized 
abridgement or copying of copyrighted works under certain circumstances. Lord Hardwicke 
stated in his ruling that there were copying acts that classify as infringement, but that does not 
mean to restrict people from creating “a real and fair abridgment.”11 Over the years, the doctrine 
of fair abridgement changed into fair use and fair dealing doctrines. 
In 1841, the US Supreme Court ruled in a case similar to Gyles called Folsam v. March 
(hereinafter Folsom).12 The Court acknowledged that there was something called fair use, but 
it concluded that there was no fair use as the Court considered derivative works as infringing 
on the right of the author,13 which is contrary to the concept of fair abridgment in Gyles. This 
is when the fair use doctrine was adopted in the US as an exception to the authors’ exclusive 
rights, and consisted of four factors, also known as the fair use test or four-factors test, that 
 
9 Id. at 134-145. This part of the book goes through a certain period in the history of copyright development. 
This part showed that the main purpose of copyright started to fade away due to the increasing adoption of 
protective measures for authors. In addition, the public interest was not presented while enacting each new 
restriction. For instance, the enactment of the US Copyright Act in 1976 “. . . the product of two decades of 
negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright office, 
and to a lesser extent, by Congress”. However, there were no representatives for the public interest. 
10 Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) (No. 130). As cited by PIERRE LEVAL, TOWARD A FAIR USE 
STANDARD, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (1990). 
11 LEVAL, supra note 10, at 1112. See SIMON FRANKEL ET. AL., BAD FAITH AND FAIR USE, 60 J. Copyright Soc'y 
U.S.A. 1, 17 (2012). In Gyles v. Wilcox, Lord Hardwicke did acknowledge that where a copy of a book is exactly 
the same as the original the copyist can be liable for infringement. However, he excluded from such acts of 
copying other attempts which aim to transform the original content into something that is also useful. He stated 
that “[w]here books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly infringement within the meaning of 
the [Statute of Anne] . . . But this must not be carried so far as to restrain persons from making a real and fair 
abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because . . . the invention, learning, 
and judgment of the [secondary] author is shewn in them . . .”. 
12 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). The court found that in cases of determining whether the 
copying act is fair use “. . . we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of 
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice 
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work”. 
13 FRANKEL, supra note 11, at 18-19. 
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determine whether the defendant’s use is fair. This test will be further discussed in detail in the 
next chapters.  
On the other hand, in the UK the fair dealing doctrine was codified in the Copyright Act of 
1911 as a replacement of the previous fair abridgment doctrine.14 In addition, fair dealing was 
adopted in other Commonwealth countries, like Canada and Australia, and Continental 
European countries,15 like Germany and France. There were also other countries that adopted 
a mixed model of the US and UK’s doctrines, like Taiwan and South Korea.16 Another notable 
example, of the mixed doctrines of fairness is the recent South-African parliament deliberations 
of integrating fair use provisions into its fair dealing model.17 In chapter three, fair dealing will 
be further discussed. 
After Folsom, the courts in the US started to rely on the principle of fair use to determine the 
legitimacy of copying acts. However, courts faced difficulties while applying fair use, and in 
certain cases these difficulties were very critical to the degree of courts’ reaching 4-4 
decisions.18 Although the 4-4 cases infrequent, it does not mean that these instances were 
unimportant as they reflected a sort of unpredictability and inconsistency in court rulings in 
cases of copyright.19 For instance, in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,20 the Court of 
Claims had a 4-4 decision that was later affirmed by a per curiam opinion by the Supreme 
Court. The decision held that the act of photocopying articles for scientific research does not 
infringe the copyright of the authors, but it is possible that things would have gone differently 
had the Court reached a full decision from the full panel of judges.21 In continuation of the 
 
14 SEAGULL SONG, REEVALUATING FAIR USE IN CHINA - A COMPARATIVE COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS OF CHINESE FAIR 
USE LEGISLATION, THE U.S. FAIR USE DOCTRINE, AND THE EUROPEAN FAIR DEALING MODEL, 51 IDEA 453, 468-
469 (2011). Making a comparative observation over other copyright statues of certain legal systems, such as UK, 
will reflect the influence of the US model of fair use over these jurisdictions. 
15 In general, Europe follows a stricter version of fair dealing which is called the enumerated permissible uses. 
This system follows a list of permissible uses that are excluded from copyright protection. This approach will be 
also mentioned in chapter III of this paper. 
16 SONG, supra note 14, at 454-455. 
17  Intellectual Property Watch, Defending Fair Use In South Africa, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/2018/12/04/defending-fair-use-south-africa/. Another example of the increasing influence of the US 
model over distant legal systems. 
18 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, FAIR USE IN A CHANGING WORLD, 50 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A., 133 (2002-2003). The 
technological progress is a main contribution to judgments’ indeterminacy in the application of fair use. 
19 Id. at 133-134. In addition to the complexities related to technological aspects, the process of balancing 
between the conflicted interests further increase courts’ susceptibility of more indeterminacies in their rulings. 
20 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
21 MICHAEL MADISON, A PATTERN-ORIENTED APPROACH TO FAIR USE, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1570-1571 (2004). 
In Madison’s analysis, he stated that this specific case happened three years before the codification of fair use 
5 
theme of inconsistencies in court decisions regarding fair use, in American Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco, Inc.,22 the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that copying journal 
articles for research purposes does not constitute an act of fair use. Although the last two 
mentioned cases share the same copying act, the courts reached different decisions.23 
Aside from the indeterminate courts’ decisions, there was another factor that kept evolving at 
that time, during 1970, which is technology. As technology evolved, the legitimacy of acts of 
copying became more difficult to determine. This is seen in several landmark cases in the US 
starting in the 1980s. In Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. also known as the 
Betamax case, 24 the US Supreme Court found that recording a show which is broadcast from 
a television for time shifting25 purposes was an act of fair use, not a violation of IP rights. This 
particular court ruling was the first step towards lessening the limitations on software copying, 
and its impact is reflected in many different contexts. For instance, in educational activities, 
professors and teachers can show students any live recorded lectures or scientific content for 
academic purposes without violating the IP rights of the creator.  
On the other hand, in countries that have adopted the fair dealing doctrine, as seen in the case 
of Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers (hereinafter ESA),26 the 
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a technology-neutral approach to copyright law. It held that 
the means of obtaining a piece of software, whether receiving a durable copy of the protected 
 
in the Copyright Act of 1976 in the US, so the Court missed the opportunity to provide a legal contribution to 
the principle of fair use before it gets codified. 
22 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995). 
23 Id. at 931. The Second Circuit stated that “[w]hatever the situation may have been previously, before the 
development of a market for institutional users to obtain licenses to photocopy articles, see Williams & Wilkins, 
. . . it is now appropriate to consider the loss of licensing revenues in evaluating ‘the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of’ journal articles. It is especially appropriate to do so with respect to . . . a 
publication as to which a photocopying license is now available”. It is to be noted that Texaco came after 
Williams & Wilkins by 20 years, which is long after the enactment of the US Copyright Act in 1976 and the 
codification of the fair use doctrine, so these different circumstances ought to shake courts’ opinions. Although 
Texaco did file a petition to the US Supreme Court to hear the case, it entered a settlement with American 
Geophysical Union shortly after. Thus, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to settle this matter. 
24  Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), available at 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/. 
25 The time shifting act is when someone records anything from a live broadcast, whether from a TV or radio, in 
order to be viewed or listened to after the live broadcast.  
26 Entertainment Software Assn v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC. See 
THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, (Michael Geist ed.) iii-iv (2013). The principle of technological neutrality developed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada is a breakthrough in cases of copyright because it allows courts to address the 
technological aspect in software copying cases as a threshold that determines whether copyright owners used 
technology to abuse their rights in obtaining incentives. 
6 
content from a store, in the mail or downloading it from the internet is neutral from the 
perspective of determining the legality of copying acts. The Court described the internet as a 
“technological taxi” meaning that its objective is just to transfer content among users, and 
further added that paying additional payments for a downloaded copy violates the principle of 
technological neutrality. 
The Betamax ruling set the foundation for fair use in the home video market. The legal 
consequences of the US Supreme Court’s decision led to a challenging situation as to whether 
any device with copying or recording capabilities could be considered as infringement in 
copyright law. The situation became even more complicated with the further technological 
advancement and the emergence of different file sharing technologies within a local network, 
such as a computer home network, and peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing over the Internet. 
With the ongoing growth of file sharing technologies, the Digital Millennium copyright act 
(DMCA) was signed in 1998 in the US.27 The act criminalizes any production or circulation of 
any sort of technology, devices or services that bypass digital rights management (DRM), and 
it also extends the reach of copyright to online content. The first major effect of the DMCA 
happened in 2001 in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster (hereinafter Napster).28 Several other 
companies including Sony, Universal, and Warner Bros, were also claimants against Napster, 
a P2P file sharing service that allowed its users to place-shift or space-shift music files.29 The 
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered both Napster and its users as being 
involved in copyright infringement, and argued that Napster should monitor copying acts on 
its server. Napster counter-argued that it was too difficult to monitor millions of copyright 
content uploaded to their server, so the Court changed the mechanism of copyright monitoring. 
It decided that it is the copyright holders’ responsibility to inform Napster of any copyright 
infringement and that Napster should comply with these requests. As a result, the coexistence 
of the DMCA and the fair use doctrine became much more difficult. 
In order to use a right, everyone should first understand what constitutes that right and what 
does not. It needs to be clear to all people what the legal entitlements granted to them are by a 
certain rule and the limits or duties for adhering to it. Therefore, knowing what software 
 
27 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 144-145. 
28 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
29 Place-shifting or space-shifting allows users to store content, such as music files, on one device that can be 
accessed from a different place through a separate device. 
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copying truly is beneficial to everyone as it often happens that someone violates copyright 
without even knowing it.30 On the other hand, many individuals are not even aware of what the 
doctrine of fair use/dealing is, which legitimatizes the act of software copying in certain 
situations. Another important consideration related to the limitations on software copying is 
the complexity behind its function. The situation of software copying gets even more 
complicated because of the scarcity of legal literacy as most of the existing writings are 
intended for law experts. For that reason, by writing a simplified and also detailed version, of 
the legal aspects of software copying intended for users, users will have a better understanding 
of the legal aspects of software copying which will make them not just capable of properly 
exercising their fair use/dealing right, but also have a role in self-monitoring any attempts that 
may hinder the progression of fair use/dealing. It is this point that prompted the Council of 
Europe to acknowledge that internet users are not mere consumers, but as independent 
individuals who can contribute to the wellbeing of a society through the government protection 
of their freedom over the internet.31 This acknowledgment  can provide crucial insights to 
lawmakers in helping them to properly address the doctrine of fair use. 
Nowadays, there are aspects of software copying left unanswered. For instance, there is no 
consensus about the possibility of creating a different set of standards or rules for fair 
use/dealing that can regulate the access to any copyrighted software. In addition, there is 
ambiguity regarding the objective of fair use/dealing because it is not clear whether fair use is 
an exception to the exclusive rights of the author or a legal entitlement for users. This ambiguity 
is reflected in cases like Betamax and Napster. Fair use was upheld in the first case, while in 
the second one the Court found that there was copyright infringement. In addition, users took 
no part in any of these cases. Yet, users had a major interest in the ruling of the two cases as 
the Betamax case involved a product that would be used by home users, and Napster was based 
on a service that was also utilized by users, so how can lawmakers properly address the issue 
of software copying acts? Is it by restraining users and giving copyright owners more protection 
or vice-versa? Ronald Coase stated that where a choice has to be made in protecting a certain 
 
30 See also R. Anthony Reeves, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History (July 2008) 183-184 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153602. Therefore, court rulings should be 
more consistent in order to provide a coherent legal framework that guides users during their interactions with 
protected content. 
31  Council of Europe, Internet Users Rights, available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/internet-users-
rights/home. Although the Council of Europe does not specifically refer to copyright, the fact that it sees users 
as contributors to the internet in general and that state actors should work on providing a safe haven for internet 
users shows that their interests should be taken under great consideration when crafting non-users’ 
entitlements. 
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right restraining a party from the other will only allow the former to harm the latter, so 
addressing such cases should look at the problem from the perspective of which party should 
be allowed to harm the other.32 However, in software copyright cases, courts need, in the first 
place, a mechanism that allows them to inspect the actions of both the plaintiff and defendant 
and equally weigh their conflicted interests in order to determine which party it is that should 
be allowed to harm the other. 
This paper attempts to address the issue of dealing with the legitimacy of software copying acts 
in current scholarship. This issue is being addressed in this paper from the point of view of 
what sorts of considerations that courts should focus more on while making their judgments. 
In observing the legal history of copyright and the relevant literature, one notes that no matter 
how many laws are promulgated or exceptions that are listed for the uses of copyrighted works 
are made, it will not lead to productive outcomes. This is because copying will continue to 
occur due to the increasing restrictions on accessing the protected content, especially when it 
comes to software copyright cases. In other words, crafting legal limits just for the sake of 
restraining users in controlling their access to protected content would result in, similar to what 
Coase argued, having the users continuously harm the copyright owners.  
In addition, technology continues to evolve. The more it progresses the more copying tools 
emerge, which makes rules and standards that existed before the latest development of 
technology quickly obsolete. Law and technology have opposite characteristics. Law has 
limits, while technology is meant to exceed the limits in order to reach higher achievements. It 
is not a question of surrendering to the difficulty of software copying cases, but, on the contrary, 
to realizing that law has finite capabilities compared to the infinite ones of technology. For this 
reason, it is important to examine the main purpose of copyright laws in order to readapt it 
within the context of software copyright and in so doing create a system that is capable of 
limiting the inconsistencies in cases of software copyright.  
By shifting to a parallel system that focuses on the characteristics of the conduct between 
authors and users, it will be possible to overcome the inconsistencies of the fair use/fair dealing 
doctrines so that societies can reach a copyright system that works for everyone at all times,33 
 
32 RONALD COASE, THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1960). 
33 CHRISTINA MULLIGAN, COPYRIGHT WITHOUT COPYING, 27 Cornell J. L. & Public Policy 469, 482 (2017). The 
nature of software copyright creates a huge flow of continuous access to content as it becomes a lot easier and 
quicker for users to interact with such content every day. As Fisher noted in his book, in many different societies, 
access to different types of entertainment, such as films, has become equally important compared to other 
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especially that people engage with varied forms of content on a daily basis. It is difficult to 
assert that there is a win-win scenario in the realm of copyright, but it is not too difficult to 
realize that the stakes are too high for doing nothing in such a context. As will be seen in this 
paper, a verdict may result in termination of a service or loss of an investment causing many 
people to lose their jobs or lead to the prevention of millions of people from accessing certain 
content. Therefore, it is not a question of who should win or lose in copyright cases, rather, it 
is to be properly equipped with the required knowledge and tools in order to make the decision 
of which party should prevail. This parallel system will offer lawmakers an alternate path for 
addressing the issue of software copying more effectively and to focus on what copyright 
should allow instead of what it should not permit. 
In chapter two, the issue of software copying will be explored based on the available theories 
of copyright protection and how the issue creates tension between private and public interests. 
Chapter three will begin with a brief discussion on the influence of the US model of fair use 
over other countries. In addition, a demonstration of fair use/fair dealing tests with a focus on 
recent cases will be presented along with a critique of their vulnerabilities that make these tests 
inconsistent. In chapter four, other approaches will be presented that can also deal with the 
issue of software copyright such as originality, technological neutrality and proportionality. 
Chapter five will illustrate a parallel system that examines the behavior of both the plaintiff 
and defendant in order to properly conduct the balancing process in claims of copyright 
infringement. Chapter six concludes with final remarks on the future of software copyright in 
light of this research. 
  
 
essentials of living, such as food. See WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP, 182 (2004). Therefore, copyright 
systems should be appropriate to everyone. 
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II. Copyright and Fairness: Private v. Public 
The theoretical aspect of IP in general and copyright in particular rests on four main theories.34 
Although these theories are related to property in general, and not specifically IP, there are 
certain court opinions related to copyright cases that have been influenced by some aspects of 
these theories. Although the philosophy of IP is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important 
to be familiar with these theories in order to identify the driving force behind the four theories 
of property and the relevant case law in the context of copyright so that one can understand 
how these theories influence courts’ application of the fair use/fair dealing doctrine. This study 
will aid in identifying an approach that is capable of providing a stable framework for courts 
in conducting the balancing process.  
A. Utilitarian Theory  
First, there is the utilitarian perspective which focuses on achieving “the greatest good for the 
greatest number,” a theory that has noticeable influence in American jurisprudence.35 The 
copyright protection from a utilitarian point of view is justified by maximizing the well-being 
of the entire society. To achieve the utilitarian goal, lawmakers need to maintain a balance 
between the protection granted to authors in guaranteeing a reward for their works as an 
incentive for them to keep being creative, and the public participation in these works, by 
allowing widespread public access to these works without heavily damaging the benefits of 
authors.36 To achieve this utilitarian objective, governments rely on creating a mixture of 
incentives and sanctions in order to stimulate the authors in maintaining the flow of innovation 
and to persuade the public to provide  incentive to these authors.37 Thus, by guaranteeing the 
proper incentive to creators, they would ensure the smooth dissemination of their content, while 
 
34 WILLIAM FISHER, THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, New Essays In The Legal And Political Theory Of 
Property, 5 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). See WILLIAM FISHER, RECONSTRUCTING THE FAIR USE 
DOCTRINE, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 8, 1686-1687 (1988). See NATALI HELBERGER ET. AL., NO PLACE 
LIKE HOME FOR MAKING A COPY: PRIVATE COPYING IN EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW AND CONSUMER LAW, 22 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1061, 1067-1068 (2007). 
35 Id. FISHER, THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 9. “the greatest good for the greatest number” is a 
paraphrase for Jeremy Bentham’s quote that “the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation 
of morals and legislation”. 
36 FISHER, supra note 34, at 1687-1688. 
37 William Fisher, CopyrightX: Lecture 4.1, Welfare Theory: The Utilitarian Framework, 4:42-5:13 available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ISstJYsCWs&feature=youtu.be. 
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users would refrain from unlawful copying attempts in order to maintain the flow of knowledge 
and information.38 
The idea of balancing between authors’ incentive to create and social welfare is not absent from 
the field of copyright. This is apparent in the Betamax case as the Court did acknowledge that 
such balancing is the purpose of copyright, in general, and fair use, in particular.39 The 
utilitarian approach can also explain the argument which contends that copyright is not a 
regulatory system or that it is not strictly about property, rather, copyright is a matter of policy, 
especially in the field of software copyright.40 This argument proposes that software copyright 
differs from tangible property and, thus, should be inserted under a system of policy 
considerations instead of property laws. It is important to note, however, that copyright should 
work for any content, tangible or intangible, and for everyone. In this way, the concept of 
property is not in the author’s creation itself, rather, it is the “bundle of rights” that are granted 
to authors in relation to their work or property.41 This perspective makes the application of the 
utilitarian theory more focused on the relation between authors and the public rather than 
having the protected property at the center of this relation. By doing so, it avoids reducing the 
progress of social welfare in favor of advancing the property protection to disproportionate 
levels. Therefore, the challenge in the application of copyright, especially in software copying, 
is not in the tangibility or intangibility of the protected content. The main concern should be 
 
38 Id. 
39 FISHER, supra note 34, at 1688-1689. In referring to the balancing nature of copyright, the Supreme Court 
stated in its ruling in Betamax that “[i]n a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we 
must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never 
contemplated such a calculus of interests. In doing so, we are guided by Justice Stewart's exposition of the 
correct approach to ambiguities in the law of copyright: 
‘The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly . . . reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the 
cause of promoting broad public availability of . . . arts. The immediate effect of 
our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an `author's' creative labor. But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good. `The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly,' . . . `lie in the general benefits derived by the public 
from the labors of authors.' . . . When technological change has rendered its literal 
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic 
purpose’”. Betamax, supra note 24, at 431-432. 
As to the balancing nature of the fair use doctrine, The Supreme Court stated, in a dissenting opinion, that “The 
fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, 
that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting 
authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others”. At 480. 
40 ADAM MOSSOFF, IS COPYRIGHT PROPERTY?, 33-34 (2005). 
41 See also WESLEY HOHFELD, SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, 
23 Yale L.J. 16, 22-23 (1913-1914). 
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centered on the actual balancing process between the authors’ bundle of rights and public 
access to their works. This is reflected in the Supreme Court’s, albeit dissenting opinion, in 
Betamax regarding the balancing nature of the fair use doctrine in considering the proper 
incentive for creators and the rest of the society’s interest in maintaining adequate access to 
protected content in order to increase people’s creativity.42 
Although the utilitarian approach seems promising, there is no mechanism to determine the 
appropriate incentive for authors and the extension of their exclusive rights and to maintain the 
proper dissemination of their works in a society.43 Therefore, the idea of balancing the interests 
of both the authors and consumers is a crucial aspect of IP in general and copyright specifically, 
but the lack of a mechanism that is capable of striking that balance makes the application of 
the utilitarian approach difficult. 
B. Lockean’ Labor Theory 
The second approach to copyright protection is based on the labor theory of John Locke.44 
Under Lockean theory, everyone has “a property in his own person,” and such property is 
reflected in the person’s work. In addition, a society will not be able to prosper unless a person 
shows labor and skill and obtains the fruits of such work.45 Furthermore, Locke puts a certain 
condition for a person to claim property rights in his or her creation which is to make sure that 
“there is enough and as good left in common for others” by not causing harm to other people, 
such as becoming poorer.46 This could also refer to situations where copyright owners aim to 
gain a monopoly or market dominance over their creation, which can hinder the ability of 
potential creators from using the monopolized work in their content.47 
The distinction between utilitarianism and naturalism is that the former leans towards the 
collective benefit of a society through the dissemination of the authors’ works, while the latter 
sees that the improvement of a society lies in giving the priority to rewarding the authors for 
 
42 See supra note 39 and accompanied text. 
43 FISHER, supra note 34, at 12. 
44 Id. at 14-15. Although the Lockean theory did not include anything explicit to IP, it did have an impact on the 
philosophy of IP. See PETER DRAHOS, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 56 (2016). Drahos mentions that 
Lock’s taking on property “. . . was part of a wider philosophical agenda on the nature of government” and that 
he most likely did not have IP in mind when addressing the concept of property. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 3 
47 WENDY GORDON, A PROPERTY RIGHT IN SELF-EXPRESSION: EQUALITY AND INDIVIDUALISM IN THE NATURAL 
LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1581-1582 (1993). 
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their creations, which can be observed in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises (hereinafter 
Harper). Here, the US Supreme Court affirmed that nothing should hinder the process of 
providing laborers the fruits of their work.48 However, the Lockean “person’s labor” aspect 
reveals that the theory does not necessarily refer to creators only. Statements like "a Property 
in his own Person" and "Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands" could refer to the act 
of creation and copying as well.49 By referring to the labor as a “person,” and not author, creator 
or owner, it could also include the works of copyists.  
In addition, taking the aspect of labor from a perspective of physical works limits the potential 
of the Lockean theory to extend in the area of software copyright. This is because in advanced 
technology physical labor can take different forms. For instance, a desktop can be a kind of 
workbench to create designs from – replacing a hammer and chisel with a mouse and keyboard 
to design real-life looking sculptures on the computer. Thus, the Lockean approach does fit 
with the context of software copyright. 
C. Personal Bond Theory 
A third approach moves the Lockean’s labor theory to another extreme which is the personality 
theory. This theory is most apparent in Europe.50 The personality perspective considers private 
property rights as an essential pillar for upholding human needs and interests.51 This approach 
considers that authors should be able to determine which parts of their works are to be used 
and to what extent in order to avoid the misrepresentation of their creations, which can lead to 
the sense of guilt that their works did not benefit other people due to its incomplete status.52 
 
48 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). The Supreme Court stated that “[w]e agree with 
the Court of Appeals that copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. But we 
believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient deference to the scheme established by the Copyright Act for 
fostering the original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred by 
copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors”. See 
FISHER, supra note 34, at 1689. In addition, there is a notable statement from Lord Mansfield, a barrister, 
politician and judge, which refers to the person’s labor and the benefit of a society: “[W]e must take care to 
guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for 
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and 
labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded”.  
49 FISHER, supra note 34, at 15. 
50 Id. at 6. 
51 Id. at 19-20. 
52 Id. at 19 
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Therefore, under the personality theory, authors are considered to have a moral bond between 
their works and themselves, and this bond must be respected.  
In addition, property rights are also required in order to protect the privacy of the authors so 
that they can choose whether to be left alone or engage with other people; this helps the authors 
to be independent and better-equipped to determine their own social and financial status.53 For 
example, German architect Meinhard von Gerkan designed a ceiling that was  quite creative 
for the German railway station Deutsche Bahn.54 However, the station owners found the design 
to be too expensive and decided to build a new and cheaper one made by another architect. 
Von Gerkan filed a lawsuit against the railway station claiming that altering his original design 
was equivalent to "ripping pages out of a novel." The Berlin Superior Court of Justice found 
that the railway station did indeed violate Von Gerkan’s rights by defacing his work of art and 
ordered it to rebuild the ceiling, even though it cost about thirty million Euros. The personal 
bond theory can be also inferred from US caselaw. For instance, in Harper the US Supreme 
Court found that the publication of quotations from a 500-page memoir was not considered fair 
use, even though the memoir related to historical facts that mattered to the public interest.55  
It is difficult for lawmakers to determine what the aspects of property are that should be 
privatized and parts that should be made publicly available due to the autonomy that results 
from the personality approach.56 In addition, there is disagreement whether such autonomy 
actually allows the authors to restrict the dissemination of their works once they go public as 
the release of the content to the public means that the works no longer solely belong to the 
author.57 Therefore, and within the European context, it suffices in certain cases to give 
 
53 Id. 
54 William Fisher, CopyrightX: Lecture 2.3, Fairness and Personality Theories: Personality, 0:13-1:28 available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsAcrcveg6k&feature=youtu.be.  
55 Harper, supra note 48, at 549. In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the 
Supreme Court stated that “. . . The Nation has admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author's original 
language totaling between 300 and 400 words and constituting some 13% of The Nation article. In using 
generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript to lend authenticity to its account of the 
forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of first publication, an important 
marketable subsidiary right . . . we find that this use of the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the verbatim 
quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable expression, was not a fair use within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act”. This statement is an indicator that the Supreme Court agrees with the rational of the District 
Court that “the totality of these facts and memoranda, collected together with Ford's reflections that made 
them of value to The Nation, [and] this . . . totality . . . is protected by the copyright laws”. At 544. 
56 FISHER, supra note 34, at 20-21. 
57 Id. at 21. 
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attribution to the original work in order to respect the moral rights of the author.58 The argument 
for the authors’ right to restrict further communication of their content is based on the 
inalienability of their interest in deciding not only a copyist's right to speak, but also the 
copyright owner's “right to refrain from speaking,” which can be seen in Harper.59  
On the other hand, the counter-argument is that the expression of an author is an external facet 
of their personality, which makes these expressions alienable as they are separate from their 
talents.60 Moreover, it is difficult to claim that others cannot copy the author’s content, not just 
because the content is exposed to the public, but also because the copy is someone else’s 
expression owned by a different personality.61 A concern that arises against such copying 
attempts is that they can be made through an automated process that does not require any skill 
to make at all.62 Thus, such copying attempts do not reflect an expression of an independent 
personality because they are just a production of a machine. Nonetheless, and as elaborated in 
the Lockean theory, signs of labor and skill can be shown without necessarily wielding a 
hammer and chisel, so making derivative works on a computer from real life designs do not 
negate the idea that there is a personal bond between the derivative work and the copyist, which 
can be reflected from Lord Hardwicke’s statement in Gyles to not “restrain persons from 
making a real and fair abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new 
book, because . . . the invention, learning, and judgment of the [secondary] author is shewn in 
them . . .” 
D. Social Planning Theory 
Finally, there is the social planning theory that aims at achieving an overall vibrant culture.63 
This theory is similar to the utilitarian approach in one aspect, but different in another.64 The 
similarity is that both the utilitarian and social planning theories share the vision of the wellness 
of a society, but they differ in terms of the plans that lead to such a good society as the views 
 
58  William Fisher, CopyrightX: Lecture 9.3, Fair Use: Other Approaches, 9:56-10:18 available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgY_lmxJwUg&feature=youtu.be.  
59  Harper, supra note 47, at 555. The Court stated that “. . . the author's right to control the first public 
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use”. See FISHER, supra note 34, at 
21. See FISHER, supra note 33, at 1690. 
60 Id. FISHER, at 21 
61 Id. 
62 Id. See JUSTIN HUGHES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Georgetown Law Journal 77, 338 
(1988). 
63 Id. at 22-23. 
64 Id. 
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of the social planning theory are more developed than the utilitarian one. Therefore, the social 
planning theory starts from a substantive vision of what is good, and then seeks to identify a 
system of IP rights that are most consistent with such a vision. 
Although there is consideration to provide a balanced incentive to foster creativity and also the 
distribution and use of the creations, the focus under the social planning approach is more 
apparent in the consumers’ role in the flourishing of cultural aspects of societies.65 To achieve 
an appealing culture, consumers should have access to large collections of knowledge and 
information – as wide as possible – so that they can effectively participate in the society. This 
is done by increasing their intellectual skills through expressing themselves in a diverse 
culture.66 In addition, to further increase the creativity and ability to communicate within a 
society, consumers should have access to complex content so that the society’s intellectual 
skills are stimulated.67 This theory is reflected in the dissenting opinion of the US Supreme 
Court in Harper, which saw that authors’ rights in copyright should serve the good of the 
public, not just their own interests.68 The idea of a flourishing culture is to make a society not 
just constituted of passive consumers, rather, to have active ones in order to create a meaningful 
culture with their active participation in shaping it.69  
The main problem with the social planning approach is that it does not provide guides for a 
society to choose its development path, whether copyright or another branch of IP or a mixture 
of IP fields that might dominate a certain culture.70 This makes the social planning theory 
unable to offer a workable plan to achieve its goals. 
E. The Driving Force Behind the Four Theories 
These four approaches – the utilitarian, Lockean, personal-bond and social planning – do not 
operate separately, rather, they are intertwined with each other. Because they represent 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Harper, supra note 48., at 580. The dissenting opinion viewed that “Because I disagree with the Court's fair 
use holding, it is necessary for me to decide the threshold copyrightability question. ‘The enactment of copyright 
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author 
has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science 
and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.’ 
. . . Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare, and not 
necessarily so as to maximize an author's control over his or her product”. 
69 FISHER, supra note 34, at 22-23. 
70 Id. 
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different thinking processes, judges often find themselves faced with multiple values that 
reflect different facets of these theories, which can influence the way courts determine the 
fairness of copying acts as demonstrated in Harper and Betamax. This makes a uniform 
application of any of these theories in the fair use/fair dealing doctrine quite difficult.71 
Furthermore, if a court adopts a certain approach to a particular case, it may apply a different 
theory for a similar subsequent case. For instance, in Betamax, the US Supreme Court found 
that time-shifting use is widespread behavior that serves the public interest and acknowledging 
otherwise would mean that there are millions of infringers;72 while in Napster, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that users who were using the service for space-shifting 
purposes through the P2P network were engaging in copyright infringements of the plaintiffs’ 
content.73 However, the Ninth Circuit in Napster did not follow a previous ruling rendered by 
the same circuit in Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. (hereinafter 
Diamond).74 In Diamond, the Ninth Circuit found that the Rio, a portable digital audio device 
manufactured by Diamond that allows a user to copy music files from a hard disk to the Rio, 
is considered as fair use under the Betamax ruling.75 Although both cases share similar 
 
71 FISHER, supra note 34, at 1691. 
72 Betamax, supra note 24, at 454. The Supreme Court, commenting on the District Court’s decision in Betamax, 
stated that “The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the extent time-shifting expands 
public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits . . . we acknowledged the public 
interest in making television broadcasting more available. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it 
supports an interpretation of the concept of ‘fair use’ that requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some 
likelihood of harm before he may condemn a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law”. The Court 
also noted the wide access to video recording capable devices as it stated that “[o]ne may search the Copyright 
Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day 
have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against 
the sale of machines that make such copying possible”. At 456. 
73 Napster, supra note 28, at 1019. The Ninth Circuit did not just make a distinction between time-shifting and 
space-shifting, but it also changed the perception of public broadcast. It is important to note that the Napster 
service did not distribute the music files to all individuals or that users distributed such content to all people. A 
user must, first, search for a certain music file, then find a match result, and, finally, connect to that user in order 
to download the music file, so it is an individual to individual interaction, not public to individual. However, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that “[w]e conclude that the district court did not err when it refused to apply the ‘shifting’ 
analyses of Sony and Diamond. Both Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of shifting in these 
cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public; the time 
or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user. In Diamond, for example, 
the copyrighted music was transferred from the user's computer hard drive to the user's portable MP3 player. 
So too Sony, where ‘the majority of VCR purchasers . . . did not distribute taped television broadcasts, but merely 
enjoyed them at home.’ Conversely, it is obvious that once a user lists a copy of music he already owns on the 
Napster system in order to access the music from another location, the song becomes ‘available to millions of 
other individuals,’ not just the original CD owner”. 
74 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). 
75 Id. at 1079. The Ninth Circuit stated that “. . . The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 
"space-shift," those files that already reside on a user's hard drive . . . Such copying is paradigmatic 
noncommercial personal use . . .”. 
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contexts, which are time-shifting and space-shifting, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
public interest in Betamax, while the Ninth Circuit in Napster did not. 
In order for courts to enforce these theories, they require a legal remedy. To protect authors’ 
rights, the system of copyright is usually based on a mixture of property and liability rules, but 
the latter has started to become a more common application than the former.76 As mentioned, 
a property is a subject of copyright, not the entitlement itself, and as a result of this connection 
an author is granted certain rights that govern how a property is administered, which are the 
bundle of rights. Among these given rights is the right to exclude, which is one of the most 
exercised rights in the system of property rules.77 In cases of copyright, property rules take the 
form of court injunctions and criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, in the event there is 
direct infringement. However, with the increasing reliance on liability rules in copyright, 
authors are currently relying on collecting royalties from the use of their works.78 Liability 
rules follow a system of compensating the damages suffered by the author in the cases of 
copyright infringement.79  
On the other hand, defendants mainly rely on the fair use/fair dealing doctrine in order to escape 
facing a property or liability rule.80 However, there are certain cases where a fair use/fair 
dealing defense does nothing to support the defendant’s claim. For instance, in 2011, the First 
Circuit of the US Court of Appeals found Joel Tenenbaum liable for paying 675,000 USD, 
adjusted from 67,500 USD, in downloading and distributing song files by using P2P 
networks.81 In 2013, The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld a decision rendered 
by the Svea Court of Appeal in Sweden that sentenced two of the founders of The Pirate Bay 
(hereinafter TPB) with ten months to the first applicant and eight months to the second one, 
 
76 DANIEL CRANE, INTELLECTUAL LIABILITY, Tex. L. Rev. 88, 2, 259 (2009). 
77 Id. 253-254. 
78 Id. 254. 
79 Id. See William Fisher, CopyrightX, Lecture 12.2, Remedies: Damages, 20:56-22:27 available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fv5FF0zugU. The four theories of copyright aim to provide creators a way 
to recover from unpermitted uses of their content through a system of indemnities. The Lockean and personality 
theories aim to provide proper incentive to creators. Thus, the absence of such an incentive will most likely entail 
a compensation. The utilitarian and social planning theories require a system of penalties in order to make users 
who obtained unpermitted access to protected works indemnify copyright owners. Therefore, creators will keep 
making new content as they are guaranteed that they will get compensated whenever there is an act of 
infringement. 
80 Users can also rely on the first sale doctrine, which allows the first purchaser of a protected content to sell it 
to another person. However, defenses of fair use/dealing have become non-effective against claims of willful or 
direct infringement. 
81 Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, No. 12-2146 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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lowered from one year for both defendants.82 In addition, the ECHR upheld the Court of Appeal 
decision in finding the defendants jointly liable for paying approximately 5 million EUR, 
adjusted from 3.3 million EUR.83 As these cases illustrate, the fair use/fair dealing defense 
compared to the gravity of property and liability rules makes the balancing process quite 
difficult. 
When all of these complexities - theories of copyright, fair use/fair dealing, property and 
liability rules -  are combined together they reflect the everlasting tension between public and 
private interests.84 These conflicts of interest should not be surprising as the purpose of 
copyright is to regulate the relations between authors and society.85 Private law grants private 
rights resulting in a certain amount of public good in protecting a society’s private interests.86 
On the other hand, public law provides rights that reflect the general interests of a society, and 
if a private right harms a public one that serves a common good, then the latter overrules the 
former.87 However, a realist approach suggests that protecting private property is a balance 
between private exclusive rights and specific public interests,88 so for a public interest to 
outweigh a private one it must be included in an exhaustive list of public rights that are set as 
exceptions to private exclusive rights. 
Thus, from this point of view, such balance works for every kind of property.89 However, to 
strike a balance between an IP and a physical one is not the same.90 The difference between the 
two kinds of property is not because of their nature, whether physical or intellectual, rather, it 
is due to the different rights attached to each type of property as the margin of rights differ 
between the two.91 For instance, a landowner has a very limited margin of rights whereby a 
state can intervene when there is a critical situation, such as the taking of land to build a public 
utility. On the other hand, a copyright owner has a much larger margin of rights compared to a 
 
82  NEIJ AND SUNDE KOLMISOPPI v. SWEDEN 40397/12, 19/02/2013, available at 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-117513%22]}. TPB is a form of P2P file sharing 
service. 
83 Id. 
84 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 180-181 (2006). See PETER JASZI, TOWARD A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT: 
THE METAMORPHOSES OF “AUTHORSHIP”, Duke Law Journal 455-502, 463-464 (1991). Available at 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol40/iss2/8.  
85 Id. at 180. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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landowner because an intellectual contribution is difficult to restrict once it goes public.92 
When a set of rights are attached to real property, such as a farm, private law protects the 
owner’s incentive and possession, while copyright protects the authors’ incentive only as long 
as the copying or the use of the content does not degrade the original condition of the work or 
affect its ownership or remove the content from its owner’s possession.93 For instance, Andrzej 
Sapkowski, a Polish author, was offered a percentage of the profits from the adaption of his 
novel into a video game. Instead, he demanded that the video game company pay him a flat fee 
for using his work.94 In this example, the author did not trade his ownership or possession of 
the novel, rather, he sold his incentive right to receive a regular income from this particular use 
of his work. In this way, the novel would remain his own original, and personally owned 
intellectual creation. The fact that the video game company took his novel and made substantial 
additions to it would not change these attributes. Therefore, the relation between public and 
private interests’ rests on determining the extent of fairness in either enforcing an author’s right 
or legitimizing a user’s copying act. 
Imposing excessive restricting measures over users’ access to copyrighted works will only slow 
the process of creation. This is the reason for Lawrence Lessig arguing that the nature of IP 
makes the use of restrictive measures, such as controlling copies and of accessing the protected 
content are against the copyright’s purpose, which is to “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts.”95 On the contrary, such protective measures may hinder that progress as they 
increase the restrictions over potential creators in accessing other protected content,96 which in 
turn will diminish the availability of new works to the public. Moreover, such measures 
 
92 Id. at 182. Thomas Jefferson has a notable statement regarding intellectual inventions: “If nature has made 
any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called 
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its 
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possess the whole of it. He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lites his taper at mine, 
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the 
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening 
their density at any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property”. 
93 Id. at 183. 
94  Charlie Hall, The Witcher author Andrzej Sapkowski demands more than $16M in royalties, available at 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/10/2/17927916/the-witcher-author-andrzej-sapkowski-royalties-cd-projekt-
red. Realizing his mistake when he sold his rights, he threatened to file a lawsuit for demanding his royalties.   
95 LESSIG, supra note 84, at 184. This is the Copyright Clause of the US Constitution, and there are other 
regulations that include similar wording that stresses on the importance of promoting and sharing knowledge 
and information. 
96 Id. 
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contribute very little to the authors’ incentive as these measures do not increase their options 
of revenues, rather, they limit the dissemination and hence the promotion of their creations. 
Due to the increasing spread of the private law concept of private property, however, the 
fundamental aspects of copyright are getting waived through a customized copyright. Such 
customization is apparent in the form of contracts, licenses, and clickwrap agreements.97 The 
most important aspect of these is fair use, which is a principle that can serve not only the interest 
of users, but also the authors as they rely on the use of previous works made by other creators.98  
In addition, the excessive usage of terms like “piracy,” “stealing,” and “theft” in the area of 
software copyright causes even more confusion as the issue transforms from being an IP one 
to that of “real property.”99 To demonstrate, the right to exclude, expel, and punish grants the 
landowner the right to use force in facing trespassers, which can be translated, in the case of 
software copyright, in allowing the copyright owners to destroy the infringers’ computers.100  
Each person is a user before anything else. There is no content entirely created by authors,101 
and excessive protection measures may hinder their creativity as all authors use the work of 
others to create their own content. Thus, imposing more restrictions will lead to discouraging 
authors to create as they will face difficulties in accessing other creators’ content.102 Therefore, 
increasing the protection of copyright can benefit authors in certain instances, while ensuring 
the proper promotion and dissemination of their intellectual contributions can help them in all 
instances. The reason is because all authors start as users until they finish their work; authors 
do not spend all of their time creating because in order to invent one would need to use first. 
Therefore, every creator is and remains a user. 
Balancing between conflicted interests is a complicated task, and it becomes even more 
complicated when the purpose of copyright gets lost amidst such conflicts. In a recent 
development in Europe in this regard, the European parliament passed certain amendments to 
 
97 Id. at 187. Clickwrap is one of the agreement forms that accompanied the advance tools of technology. The 
clickwrap is basically is a prompt or message that appears to consumers while using a software that asks them 
for acceptance of the applied policy on the content in order to open it. 
98 Id. at 185. 
99 FISHER, supra note 33, at 134. 
100 Id. at 136-137 and 151. 
101 LEVAL, supra note 10, at 1109. See GORDON, supra note 47, at 1556. 
102 STEPHEN MCJOHN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE, 28 Rutgers L.J. 593, 602 (1997). 
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the EU Copyright Directive.103 The most important aspect of these amendments is the 
secondary liability of service providers. This means that all intermediary services are also 
responsible for copyrighted content on their websites, which is known as secondary liability. 
This sort of liability can be found in Napster as the Court found the intermediary service, 
Napster, engaged in a secondary liability of copyright infringement. The problem, however, is 
that users are dragged into a “corporate war” between service providers and publishers; users 
are encouraged by service providers to protest the amendments. On the other hand, publishers 
are also urging creators to support the amendments made to the directive.  
This financial dispute between service providers and publishers as copyright owners is not a 
conflict that users or creators should be involved in.104 Not all authors, service providers, 
publishers or users are financially equal as many of them are susceptible to severe economic 
situations, especially if a new law sets new restrictions on them. It is possible to claim that the 
problem is that authors do not have enough protection as publishers tend to maximize their 
profits at the expense of the author.105 While this is true, granting more protections to authors 
will only lead to further maximization of publishers’ profits as they are vested in the authors’ 
copyright. In addition, users will be affected by the increased protection in the further 
tightening of the control over content dissemination. Moreover, the more these protections are 
strengthened, the less effective fair use/fair dealing becomes as a defense against copyright 
infringement claims. In this way, the balancing process of the doctrine of fair use/fair dealing 
is hindered. It is for this reason that maintaining the purpose of copyright through preserving 
fair use/fair dealing protection is important for users and authors alike.106 
In conclusion, the tension between public and private interests is to remain within copyright 
system. However, it does not mean that there are no tools that can keep this tension intact and 
also maintain the balance between public and private interests. The next chapter will discuss 
the principle of fair use/dealing and its role in maintaining the balance between public and 
private interests. 
 
103  Matt Reynolds, What is Article 13? The EU's divisive new copyright plan explained, available at 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-article-13-article-11-european-directive-on-copyright-explained-
meme-ban.  
104 JESSICA LITMAN, WHAT WE DON’T SEE WHEN WE SEE COPYRIGHT AS PROPERTY, 77 CAMBRIDGE L.J., 4-5 
(2018). 
105 Id. 
106 LESSIG, supra note 84, at 184-185. 
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III. Fairness in Software Copyright 
Many jurisdictions are drawn to the US model of fair use.107 The US concerted efforts to mold 
treaties that govern IP rights to conform to its own system reflects the intention to export its IP 
system, or at least a quasi-US IP system, to the highest possible number of countries. For 
instance, treaties like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) that force the signatories to ratify an IP system that matches or closely 
resembles  the US one makes the idea of exporting the US fair use model to other states a valid 
one.108 Although the fate of these treaties, especially ACTA, is not yet certain, the US may 
succeed in pushing these treaties to become official or opt to craft a new treaty.109 This chapter 
discusses the influence of the US fair use model in the Egyptian copyright systems and other 
jurisdictions. In addition, the chapter presents the US fair use model and its application in 
lawsuits related to software copyright along with an evaluation to this particular model. 
Afterwards, the chapter presents the principle of fair dealing and enumerated permissible uses 
(hereinafter EPUs) in their relevant caselaw. Finally, the chapter ends with a critique of the 
principle of fair use/dealing and the reasons to reconsider the existing factors of the fair 
use/dealing tests. 
A. The Influence of the US Fair Use Model on Different Jurisdictions including 
the Egyptian Context 
Countries such as Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have applied 
the US fair use model or similar legal concepts in their own countries.110 Even countries that 
adopt their own fair dealing provisions have been influenced by the US model of fair use, such 
as Canada.111 Canada has not had many copyright lawsuits.112 However, in 2012, the Canadian 
Supreme Court rendered five decisions on five copyright cases in a single day, and a few of 
 
107  PAMELA SAMUELSON ET. AL., IS THE U.S. FAIR USE DOCTRINE COMPATIBLE WITH BERNE AND TRIPS 
OBLIGATIONS? 13 (2018). The article argues that the US model of fair use is consistent with the TRIPS three-
step-test. The authors demonstrate this argument by showing, among other things, a non-exhaustive list of 
countries that adopted similar fair use provisions. Thus, reflecting the influence of the US fair use model over 
other jurisdictions. 
108 See William Fisher, CopyrightX: Lecture 1.4, The Foundations of Copyright Law: Multilateral Treaties, 33:38-
35:21 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00Bq5n7wYn0. 
109 William Fisher, CopyrightX, Lecture 11.3, Supplements to Copyright: Tech Protection Measures, 7:42-9:28 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVe6dCuJ4M0&feature=youtu.be. It is worth noting that the 
DMCA could have been a multilateral treaty. 
110 SAMUELSON, supra note 107. 
111 GEIST, supra note 26, at vii. 
112 Id. at iii. Stating that the Canadian Supreme Court had just one case related to copyright every few years. 
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these cases were related to software copyright.113 Another approach, which is the EPUs can be 
found in many parts of Europe.114 EPUs is based on listing certain types of usage for copying 
protected content without constituting an infringement. Later in this chapter, it will be shown 
that fair dealing and EPUs coexist in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK. 
The increasing development of technology and the complexities of the recording and sharing 
tools make the US fair use doctrine appealing to other states.115 For instance, the recent South-
African parliament deliberations of integrating fair use provisions into its fair dealing model 
provides an example of developing countries in Africa who have adopted the US fair use 
doctrine.116 In addition, in Egypt, although there are exceptions in the Egyptian IP law of 2002 
that are applied on the author’s rights in favor of the users, in Article 171 the law does not say 
anything explicit regarding the principle of fair use.117 In terms of software copyright, Article 
171 only addresses author’s restrictions on copying acts of all or a substantial part of a database 
or computer program subject to copyright, and that any copying or adaptation of the program 
for the purpose of archiving or recovering a lost original copy must be followed by the author’s 
consent.118 There was an attempt by the Library of Alexandria, however, to push Article 171 
towards the context of fair use, but in terms of acts of software copying the Library prohibited 
them under its internal policy, not the Egyptian IP law.119 Therefore, there is no legal claim of 
fair use/dealing under the Egyptian IP law. 
 
113 Id. 
114 Fisher, supra note 58, at 5:55-6:35. 
115 SAMUELSON, supra note 107, at 14. 
116  Intellectual Property Watch, Defending Fair Use In South Africa, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/2018/12/04/defending-fair-use-south-africa/. 
117  WIPO, Law No. 82 of 2002 on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, available at 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/1301. Article 171 states that “[w]ithout prejudice to the moral 
rights of the author under this Law, the author may not, after the publication of the work, prevent third parties 
from carrying out any of the following acts: . . .”. It only provides a list of certain copying acts that users can 
make without infringing the author’s rights. 
118 Id. The article states that a user can “[m]ake, with the consent of the legitimate owner of the program, a 
single copy or an adaptation of a computer program, even if exceeding the extent necessary for the use of the 
program inasmuch as it remains within the limits of the purpose for which consent was initially granted, for 
archiving purposes or to replace a lost, destroyed or invalid original copy. In either case, the original or adapted 
copy shall be destroyed upon expiration of the property title. The Regulations shall determine the terms and 
conditions of adaptation from the program”. 
119  The Library of Alexandria, Copyright Policies, available at 
https://www.bibalex.org/Libraries/Presentation/Static/15680.aspx. “Fair Use (Article 171 of the Egyptian Law 
of Intellectual Property 82 of 2002) is a complex doctrine meant to facilitate certain valuable social and 
educational purposes. Fair use allows parts of a copyrighted work to be used without requesting permission and 
without violating, or infringing, the copyright. However, only a limited portion of a work is allowed to be copied. 
According to an article of the Fair Use Doctrine, the copyright holder cannot forbid anyone from doing any of 
the following . . .”. Although there are no articles in the Egyptian IP law that refer to fair use, rather they include 
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However, the lack of fair use/dealing claims in the Egyptian IP law has not prevented scholars 
from addressing such claims in their writings. In general, there is a growing scholarly interest 
to analyze the situation of accessing knowledge and information in Egypt.120 This interest is 
reflected in increasing restrictions over protected content against unauthorized usage. These 
new policy considerations are required to prevent the complex system of IP protection from 
hindering the promotion and innovation of creative content and harming the public interest in 
accessing knowledge and information.121 Furthermore, the complex issue of protecting digital 
content is also addressed within the Egyptian context in terms of balancing between private 
monopolies and social welfare.122 In addition, the role of the Egyptian software industry in 
helping with the access to knowledge and information has been analyzed.123 In particular, there 
has been a suggestion to implement the “broader” US model of fair use in the Egyptian context 
by replacing the narrower conditions provided in the Egyptian copyright rules with it.124 
However, there are no existing studies within the academic field in Egypt to date that address 
the issues of fair use/dealing in its respective jurisdictions and to formulate possible remedies 
to such disadvantages as a means to make this foreign principle more likely to be applied in 
the Egyptian copyright system. 
In spite of its influence, the US model of fair use does not come without its own problems. 
Although the US doctrine of fair use is one of the oldest models, and still applicable in 
balancing between the interests of copyright owners and users compared to other ones, its 
inconsistency and unpredictability reduce the advantage of the doctrine in cases of software 
copying. For this reason, knowing how fair use is applied, how it has been adopted in other 
jurisdictions, and how similar provisions fare in resolving software copyright issues is useful 
to properly address the fairness of software copying. 
 
certain permissible uses, the Library of Alexandria still included the principle of fair use in its copyright policy, 
minus the factors. It is worth noting that the Library of Alexandria utilized in its language “the fair use doctrine”, 
which reflects the extent of influence created by the US model of fair use. 
120 NAGLA RIZK & LEA SHAVER (eds.), ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN EGYPT NEW RESEARCH ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
121 Id. at 1-2. 
122 Id. at 96-97. 
123 Id. at 134- 135. 
124 JEREMY DE BEER, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT, 41-42 (2010). In a study 
conducted by Hassan Al-Badrawy and Hossam Al-Saghir called “Copyright in the Egyptian law: an analysis from 
a development perspective”, there were several suggestions made to improve the Egyptian copyright rules. 
Among these suggestions was adopting the US model of fair use. 
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B. The US Model of Fair Use 
Fair use, under the US model, is a legal privilege granted to users that allow them to make 
lawful copying acts under certain circumstances; this means that a copyright owner has no right 
to prevent the fair user from copying, and that the owner has a legal duty to allow the user to 
do so. The current method of determining the fairness of the copying act entails four factors: 
the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the quantity and 
importance of the used material, and the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of 
the copyrighted work.125  
These four factors were established in Folsom and are still followed by the US courts in 
determining fair use claims in copyright cases. While they are regularly applied, the four factors 
test is still criticized due to its inability to cover all acts of copying that are made through 
complex technological means as it partly focuses on the economic value of the use.126 For 
instance, the purpose of the use examines whether it is intended for commercial purposes. In 
addition, the flexibility of fair use is a double-edged sword; it can be applied to many complex 
cases of copyright, but its flexibility can also lead to multiple interpretations of the doctrine for 
the same type of disputes, which can result in contradictory judgments among court rulings.127 
1. Purpose and Character 
The first of the four factors in determining the fairness of the copying act is purpose and 
character. It is associated with commercial and transformative uses.128 One of the most 
important commercial use examples is the Betamax case. The Supreme Court considered the 
act of “time-shifting,” taping a live broadcast for later viewing as a noncommercial act.129 In 
 
125 LEVAL, supra note 10, at 1111-1124. 
126 MADISON, supra note 21, at 1587. Madison states that the four factors do not provide clear separation 
between “fair and unfair uses” when it comes to copying acts of software content. He argues that separating 
between fair and unfair uses of such acts will be difficult by only following “the language of the statute”, which 
explains the reason courts rely on theory in interpreting fair use, which is something he argues against as he 
sees that courts should constrain fair use instead of theorizing it. See PATTERSON, supra note 4. 
127 STEPHEN MCJOHN, FAIR USE AND PRIVATIZATION IN COPYRIGHT, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 62 (1998). Although 
Mcjohn sees that flexibility will serve copyright best, he does concur that there are indeterminacies in fair use 
cases as they cause “a disproportionate share of reversals and divided courts”. See STEPHEN THAU, COPYRIGHT, 
PRIVACY, AND FAIR USE, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 179, 221 (1995). Similarly, Thau agrees that the flexibility of the fair 
use analysis causes inconsistencies in copyright cases, but he argues that such flexibility is, despite the 
inconsistencies, the best option in the context of copyright. 
128 SONG, supra note 14, at 456-458. 
129 Betamax, supra note 24, at 449. In analyzing the first factor, The Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the Betamax 
were used to make copies for a commercial or profitmaking purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. 
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addition to Betamax, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (hereinafter Campbell),130 the defendant 
created a song based on one by Roy Orbinson's “Pretty Woman” with the intent of making a 
parody of it. The Supreme Court ruled that an act of parody, even if it is for commercial use, 
can be constituted as fair use. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially decided that 
the commercial nature of the copying act made it unfair. The Supreme Court, in overturning 
the decision stated that a use which is made for educational purpose neither makes it fair nor a 
commercial use renders it unfair.131 
The courts must consider all of the factors in a case, but the statute does not determine whether 
one factor weighs more than another.132 In addition, there are no rules that oblige courts to 
restrict themselves to using the four steps of fair use they can consider other aspects of the law 
as well.133 The transformative use shows some sort of creation in the copying act, not just 
copying the content without making any changes to it. 134 In Campbell, the transformative 
factor was the main reason for the Supreme Court’s consideration that parody is fair use as it 
shows an act of transforming the original content’s character into something else, which is 
parody in this case.135 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor in determining the fairness of the copying act is the nature of the copyrighted 
work which is associated with the status of the protected content – whether the content is 
 
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish 
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity”. 
130 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
131 Id. at 570. In the first factor, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he Court of Appeals properly assumed that 2 
Live Crew's song contains parody commenting on and criticizing the original work, but erred in giving virtually 
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of that parody by way of a presumption, . . .”. In addition, the Court 
further added that “. . . the mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a 
finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness”. At 584. 
132 THAU, supra note 127, at 185. However, and as will be demonstrated, there are certain cases where one of 
the factors was definitive in their outcome. 
133 Id. 
134 SONG, supra note 14, at 456-458. 
135 Campbell, supra note 130, at 594. The Court concluded that “[i]t was error for the Court of Appeals to 
conclude that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ rendered it presumptively 
unfair. No such evidentiary presumption is available to address either the first factor, the character and purpose 
of the use, or the fourth, market harm, in determining whether a transformative use, such as parody, is a fair 
one”. In addition, the Court mentioned “[t]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use”. At 569. This way of stressing 
on the importance of the transformative aspect of a use will be seen again in this chapter.  
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“factual or fictional” and if it is “published or unpublished.”136 In the case of published content, 
courts look to the level of creativity reflected in the content itself. For instance, a work of 
fantasy involves more creativity compared to a factual work. This makes fair use more likely 
to be considered in the latter rather than the former as the presentation of facts tends to have 
less protection compared to other non-fictional works.137 This step is similar to what is called 
the doctrine of originality as it looks for a certain level of creativity that can be attributed to the 
author. The resemblance lies in the idea of measuring a specific degree of originality. As to 
unpublished content, courts generally do not exclude a finding of fair use in the copying acts 
of unpublished content.138 However, in Harper, the US Supreme Court found that the act of 
distributing excerpts of an unpublished memoir was indeed unfair.139 
3. Quantity and Importance of the Used Material 
The third factor in determining the fairness of the copying act is the quantity and importance 
of the used material based on the amount that is copied and whether the copied portion, 
regardless of its size, is significant relative to the protected content.140 In Betamax, the Supreme 
Court considered that simple reproduction of live broadcasts through videotapes was not 
necessarily an infringement.141 On the other hand, in Napster, the US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found that users who reproduce music files through the sharing network are guilty 
of infringement.142 In another notable case, Harper, the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the Second Circuit due to its following a quantitative approach in ruling that such short 
excerpts should not be considered as substantial parts of the whole work.143 
 
136 SONG, supra note 14, at 456-458. If a content is published, courts do not pause to look at the status of its 
publicity as it is already published, so they move directly at the step of whether the content is factual or fictional. 
On the other hand, unpublished works prompt courts to see whether the status of the work as unpublished can 
result against the finding of fair use. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. Section 107 of the Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use of the US Copyright Act states that “[t]he fact 
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of 
all the above factors”. Pub. L. 102-492, Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3145. 
139 See Harper, supra note 48 and accompanied text. It is important to note that in Harper the copied excerpts 
were not only unpublished, but they were also factual, which should have received less protection. 
140 SONG, supra note 14, at 456-458. 
141 Betamax, supra note 24, at 450. The Court stated that “. . . the fact that the entire work is reproduced . . . 
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use”. 
142 Napster, supra note 28, at 1014. The Ninth Circuit determined “. . . that plaintiffs have shown that Napster 
users infringe at least two of the copyright holders’ exclusive rights: the rights of reproduction . . . and 
distribution, . . .”. 
143 See Harper, supra note 48, at 565. The Supreme Court stated that “. . . the Act directs us to examine the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. In absolute terms, 
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4. Effect of the Use on the Market 
The fourth factor in determining the fairness of the copying act is the effect of the use upon the 
potential market or value of the copyrighted work. It aims to provide the authors financial 
revenue from their work so that it can serve as an incentive for them to create more work by 
guaranteeing that the use will not harm their financial status.144 However, in Campbell, the 
Supreme Court did not find that an act of parody, even if it would affect the original content, 
was not fair use under this factor.145 
In Campbell, the Court’s rationale was that even if a work of parody resulted in decreasing 
demand for the original content, it is not considered a “harm” under the US Copyright Act.146 
On the other hand, in Napster, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding 
concerning the download of music files by Napster and the negative effects caused by such 
activity on the plaintiffs’ financial status. This finding was based on the decrease of music file 
sales among the plaintiffs’ most important demography, college students, and disrupting the 
plaintiffs’ plans to enter the digital download market.147 
In the next section, the fair use test will be further discussed in order to see how it fares in the 
context of software copying. 
 
the words actually quoted were an insubstantial portion of ‘A Time to Heal.’ The District Court, however, found 
that ‘[T]he Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book.’ . . . We believe the Court of Appeals erred 
in overruling the District Judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking. See, e. g., Roy Export Co. 
Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 503 F. Supp., at 1145 (taking of 55 seconds out of 1 hour 
and 29-minute film deemed qualitatively substantial)”. 
144 SONG, supra note 14, at 462. 
145 See Campbell, supra note 130 at 591. The Supreme Court stated that “[n]o ‘presumption’ or inference of 
market harm that might find support in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplication 
for commercial purposes. The cognizable harm is market substitution, not any harm from criticism. As to parody 
pure and simple, it is unlikely that the work will act as a substitute for the original, since the two works usually 
serve different market functions”. 
146 Id. at 23 at 591-592. The Court further mentioned that “[w]e do not, of course, suggest that a parody may 
not harm the market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, 
it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. Because ‘parody may quite legitimately aim at 
garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically,’ . . ., the role of the courts is to distinguish 
between ‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement, which usurps it’”. 
147 See Napster, supra note 28, at 1016. In addressing the fourth factor, the Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals 
stated that “. . . the district court concluded that Napster harms the market in at least two ways: it reduces audio 
CD sales among college students and it raises barriers to plaintiffs’ entry into the market for the digital 
downloading of music”. The Court stated that “[w]e, therefore, conclude that the district court made sound 
findings related to Napster’s deleterious effect on the present and future digital download market. Moreover, 
lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative 
markets for the works”. At 1017. 
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a. Fair Use in Action 
One of the important cases in the field of software copyright is Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 
(hereinafter Kelly).148 In this case, the defendant, Arriba Soft, allowed the visibility of 
thumbnails in its search results by the search engine. The plaintiff, Kelly, a photographer, filed 
a lawsuit against Arriba Soft for showing some of her works in the form of thumbnails and 
full-sized images of Kelly’s photography that she sells to different publications.149  
The Ninth Circuit Court considered that the search results of the small-sized pictures as fair 
use under the first factor, purpose and character. The main element in determining the fairness 
of showing the thumbnails is the transformative use resulting from it.150 Transformative use is 
reflected in the lower resolution of the thumbnails, and that they differed significantly from the 
original ones.151 One notices here that the transformation element does not mean that the use 
provides a more creative copy, rather, it means that the use resulted in a substantial change to 
the original content, regardless of the quality. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
thumbnails aimed to facilitate access to these images as a matter of convenience, not to provide 
the original content to users.152  
Under the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
thumbnails were fair use. The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge the creativity behind the 
photographs, but the fact that these photos were already published on Kelly’s website made 
this factor not so decisive in the plaintiff’s favor.153 In terms of the third factor, the amount and 
 
148 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) withdrawn, re-filed at 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
149 SONG, supra note 14, at 463-464.  
150 See Kelly, supra note 148 at 818. In the first factor, purpose and character of the use, the Ninth Circuit of the 
Court of Appeals found that “[t]he more transformative the new work, the less important the other factors, 
including commercialism, become”, especially that the court determined that “the commercial nature of the use 
weighs only slightly against a finding of fair use”. 
151 Id. at 819. In continuation of the Ninth Circuit’s finding concerning the first factor, it stated that “[t]his case 
involves more than merely a retransmission of Kelly's images in a different medium. Arriba's use of the images 
serves a different function than Kelly's use-improving access to information on the internet versus artistic 
expression. Furthermore, it would be unlikely that anyone would use Arriba's thumbnails for illustrative or 
aesthetic purposes because enlarging them sacrifices their clarity. Because Arriba's use is not superseding Kelly's 
use but, rather, has created a different purpose for the images, Arriba's use is transformative”. 
152 Id. at 820. The Ninth Circuit further added that “Arriba's use of Kelly's images promotes the goals of the 
Copyright Act and the fair use exception. The thumbnails do not stifle artistic creativity because they are not 
used for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for the originals. In addition, 
they benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet”. 
153 Id. In the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[p]hotographs that 
are meant to be viewed by the public for informative and aesthetic purposes, such as Kelly's, are generally 
creative in nature. The fact that a work is published or unpublished also is a critical element of its nature. 
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substantiality of portion used, even though the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant copied 
the entirety of the protected content, it considered that such a copying act was necessary for 
Arriba in order for it to give the users the choice to be redirected to the original content.154 
Here, the thumbnails served as a transitional phase for the users to access the photographs. 
However, the Ninth Circuit did find that this factor weighed neither for nor against either of 
the parties.  
In terms of the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the 
copyrighted work, the Ninth Circuit found that the thumbnails did not cause market damage to 
the plaintiff. On the contrary, the copying act of the defendant may have helped the plaintiff’s 
financial status as the thumbnails allowed the users to find the photographs easier, not to 
mention the transformative use of the protected content.155 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected 
the fair use claim for the full-sized images shown in the search results. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
considered the use of thumbnails as fair, but it rejected the fair use claim in the use of the full-
sized images that appeared in search results. 
Another important case in the field of software copyright is The Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. 
Google, Inc. (hereinafter Google Books) which took more than a decade to completely 
resolve.156 The case is related to the project of Google Books which aims to provide a digital 
library comprised of a huge number of scanned books.157 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit considered Google’s copying act as a matter of public interest.158 The decisive factors 
 
Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of the artist's expression has 
already occurred. Kelly's images appeared on the internet before Arriba used them in its search image. When 
considering both of these elements, we find that this factor weighs only slightly in favor of Kelly”. 
154 Id. at 821. In the third factor, amount and substantiality of portion used, the Ninth Circuit determined that it 
“. . . neither weighs for nor against either party because, although Arriba did copy each of Kelly's images as a 
whole, it was reasonable to do so in light of Arriba's use of the images. It was necessary for Arriba to copy the 
entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more information about the 
image or the originating web site. If Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to identify 
it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine”. 
155 Id. As to the fourth and final factor, effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a] transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market 
of the original than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work”. The Court further added that “Arriba's 
use of Kelly's images in its thumbnails does not harm the market for Kelly's images or the value of his images. By 
showing the thumbnails on its results page when users entered terms related to Kelly's images, the search engine 
would guide users to Kelly's web site rather than away from it”. 
156 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 13-4829 (2d Cir. 2015). 
157  Andrea Peterson, Google Books just won a decade-long copyright fight, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/04/18/google-books-just-won-a-decade-long-
copyright-fight/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ecc652a1a900.  
158 Google Books, supra note 156. The Second Circuit stated that “Google’s making of a digital copy to provide a 
search function is a transformative use, which augments public knowledge by making available information 
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in Google Books were the first – purpose and character – and the fourth – the effect of the use 
upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.159 By creating a digital library that 
allows users to search for texts, the Second Circuit found the copying act of Google in digitizing 
the books immensely transformative.160 The high transformative value in this case eclipsed the 
element of Google’s commercial use.161 Although the Second Circuit found under the fourth 
factor – the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work – that 
“snippet view”162 may result in a financial loss to the authors, it considered market damage 
claims as presumptive and not based on real evidence.163 In addition, there are scanned texts 
that contained materials not subject to copyright, such as historical facts, so market damage 
 
about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a substantial substitute for matter protected by the 
Plaintiffs’ copyright interests in the original works or derivatives of them”. 
159 Id. Similar to Kelly, the Second Circuit contented, quoting another decision, that “. . . as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, Congress could not have intended a rule that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. Instead, 
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use”. Even when addressing the second and third factors, the Second 
Circuit emphasized on the transformative aspect of Google Books. In the second factor, the Second Circuit stated 
that “[w]hile the ‘transformative purpose’ inquiry discussed above is conventionally treated as a part of first 
factor analysis, it inevitably involves the second factor as well. One cannot assess whether the copying work has 
an objective that differs from the original without considering both works, and their respective objectives”. It 
further added that “. . . the second factor favors fair use not because Plaintiffs’ works are factual, but because 
the secondary use transformatively provides valuable information about the original, rather than replicating 
protected expression in a manner that provides a meaningful substitute for the original”. As to the third factor, 
the Second Circuit determined that “not only is the copying of the totality of the original reasonably appropriate 
to Google’s transformative purpose, it is literally necessary to achieve that purpose. If Google copied less than 
the totality of the originals, its search function could not advise searchers reliably whether their searched term 
appears in a book (or how many times)”. 
160 Id. Concerning the transformative aspect, the Second Circuit stated that “[w]e have no difficulty concluding 
that Google’s making of a digital copy of Plaintiffs’ books for the purpose of enabling a search for identification 
of books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a highly transformative purpose, in the sense 
intended by Campbell”. See Andrew Baer, Google Books Case Transforms the Fair Use Standard, available at 
http://www.baercrossey.com/1723/google-books-case-transforms-the-fair-use-standard.  
161 Id. The Second Circuit acknowledged that “[w]hile we recognize that in some circumstances, a commercial 
motivation on the part of the secondary user will weigh against her, especially, as the Supreme Court suggested, 
when a persuasive transformative purpose is lacking, . . ., we see no reason in this case why Google’s overall 
profit motivation should prevail as a reason for denying fair use over its highly convincing transformative 
purpose, together with the absence of significant substitutive competition, as reasons for granting fair use”. 
162 Snippet view means viewing small parts of texts. 
163 Google Books, supra note 156. The Second Circuit affirmed that “[w]e recognize that the snippet function can 
cause some loss of sales. There are surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a text will be satisfied 
by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of a sale to that searcher, or reduction of demand on libraries for 
that title, which might have resulted in libraries purchasing additional copies. But the possibility, or even the 
probability or certainty, of some loss of sales does not suffice to make the copy an effectively competing 
substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth factor in favor of the rights holder in the original. There must be a 
meaningful or significant effect ‘upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work’”. 
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would not apply to such uncopyrightable content.164 Thus, the Second Circuit upheld the 
defense of fair use in this case. 
b. Fair Use Evaluation 
Although the US fair use model was established long before the current technological copying 
tools came into existence, courts have relied on it, and still do, in several difficult cases in 
contemporary legal history. The Betamax case is one of the most important examples in the 
modern history of fair use as it sheds light on the missing component in the doctrine that could 
have made it more capable of handling software copying cases.165  
The Betamax ruling has echoed in other cases as well. For instance, in Sega v. Accolade 
(hereinafter Sega),166 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered Accolade’s 
circumvention of Sega’s protection measure in its Genesis console as fair use.167 Accolade’s 
aim was to make their video games playable on the Genesis console, so they bypassed the 
console’s security measure in order to achieve their goal.168 The Ninth Circuit considered, 
under the first factor, that Accolade did copy Sega’s code in the Genesis console for 
commercial purpose, but it also used the protected product to study the functionality of Sega’s 
console so that Accolade could make its video games playable on the Genesis.169 In addition, 
the Ninth Circuit found no alternate way for Accolade to achieve its objective, so it found 
Accolade’s act as fair use because the commercial aspect was not decisive in this instance.170 
In the second factor, the Ninth Circuit found that it was necessary for Accolade to break the 
 
164 Google Books, supra note 156. Moreover, the Second Circuit contended that this “. . . type of loss of sale . . . 
will generally occur in relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright. A snippet’s capacity to satisfy 
a searcher’s need for access to a copyrighted book will at times be because the snippet conveys a historical fact 
that the searcher needs to ascertain”. 
165 MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD, 62 
(2007). 
166 Sega Enterprises Ltd. vs Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
167 Id. at 1574. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that “[w]e conclude that where disassembly is 
the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program 
and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work”. 
See JULIE AGUILAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD. V. ACCOLADE, INC.: SETTING THE 
STANDARD ON SOFTWARE COPYING IN THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, 275-276 (1993). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1522. The Ninth Circuit stated, when analyzing the first factor, that “. . . although Accolade’s ultimate 
purpose was the release of Genesis-compatible games for sale, its direct purpose in copying Sega’s code, and 
thus its direct use of the copyrighted material, was simply to study the functional requirements for Genesis 
compatibility so that it could modify existing games and make them usable with the Genesis console”. 
170 Id. Continuing from the first factor, the Ninth Circuit added that “. . . no other method of studying those 
requirements was available to Accolade”. 
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code of Sega’s protection measure so that it could learn how the Genesis console operated in 
order to make its video games playable on the Genesis.171 In the third factor, the Ninth Circuit 
considered Accolade’s taking apart of the entirety of programs that were written by Sega as an 
unlawful attempt in achieving its objective.172 However, the Ninth Circuit noted that even if 
the whole work made by Sega has been modified by Accolade, it does not rule out the finding 
of fair use.173 The fourth factor weighed against Sega.174 Although the Ninth Circuit found that 
Sega would encounter a financial loss due to Accolades’ act of copying, it noted Sega’s attempt 
at monopolizing the market to make it unachievable for other competitors to promote their 
creative work.175 This case further developed Betamax achievements in software copyright. 
However, these court opinions were not always the same. In 1993, in MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer Inc.,176 the Ninth Circuit held that even the temporary copying of a PDF file 
that is stored in the Random-Access Memory (RAM) is actually a copyright infringement.177 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit disregarded Sega’s decision where it did not count the 
functionality of the program as a copyrightable matter. In addition, Betamax and Sega’s 
accomplishments were increasingly affected by the enactment of the DMCA.178 The reversal 
was clear in the Napster case. 
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found that the Napster service is capable of non-infringing uses,179 
despite copying the entirety of music files, but it considered that Napster commercially 
 
171 Id. at 1526. In addressing the second factor, the Ninth Circuit stated that “. . . the record clearly establishes 
that disassembly of the object code in Sega’s video game cartridges was necessary in order to understand the 
functional requirements for Genesis compatibility. The interface procedures for the Genesis console are 
distributed for public use only in object code form, and are not visible to the user during operation of the video 
game program. Because object code cannot be read by humans, it must be disassembled, either by hand or by 
machine”. “Object code” is the public version of “source code”. Copyright owners keep the source code, the 
human readable code, to themselves in order to protect their creations. 
172 Id. In the third factor, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “. . . Accolade disassembled entire programs written 
by Sega. Accordingly, the third factor weighs against Accolade”. 
173 Id. The Ninth Circuit further added that “[t]he fact that an entire work was copied does not, however, 
preclude a finding of fair use”. 
174 Id. at 1524. The Ninth Circuit concluded, concerning the fourth factor, “. . . that the fourth statutory factor 
weighs in Accolade’s, not Sega’s, favor, notwithstanding the minor economic loss Sega may suffer”. 
175 Id. 
176 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
177 Id. See MULLIGAN, supra note 36, at 473. 
178 See RIMMER, supra note 165. 
179 Napster, supra note 28, at 1021. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court by stating that “[w]e 
depart from the reasoning of the district court that Napster failed to demonstrate that its system is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses”. 
35 
benefited from having these music files shared through its service.180 In addition, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the widespread transfer of these creative works, in this case music files, 
damaged the current and future market status for the authors.181 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that users were engaging in infringing behavior.182 The changes between Napster and 
Betamax are significant. First, the Court considered user’s behavior in Betamax as a 
noncommercial private activity, while acknowledging the infringement acts of users in 
Napster. Second, the Court did not give importance to the effect on the potential market, but in 
Napster the Ninth Circuit highly relied on it. 
C. The Canadian Fair Dealing 
Unlike the US, the Canadian model of fair dealing used to entail a preliminary phase whereby 
the defendant has to prove the claim of fair dealing. This is similar to the UK model in that 
courts follow a similar test to the US model of fair use.183 After 2004, the Supreme Court of 
Canada changed the rules of fair dealing claims.184 Currently, the fair dealing test is based on 
the purpose of the dealing, its character, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, 
nature of the protected work, and the effect of the dealing on the market.185  
One of the important Canadian cases in the field of software copyright is Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v Bell Canada (hereinafter SOCAN).186 By 
relying on a previous case called CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada 
(hereinafter CCH) that introduced a broad interpretation of research works,187 the Supreme 
Court of Canada found that song previews that exist on services such as iTunes are considered 
as fair dealing.188 The Court at first acknowledged that fair dealing is a user’s right, so there 
 
180  Id. at 1015. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a 
commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not 
offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use”. 
181 Id. supra note 147. 
182 Id. supra note 142. 
183 SONG, supra note 14, at 473. 
184 Id. 
185 GEIST, supra note 26, at 169-170. 
186 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36. See 
GEIST, supra note 26, at 171-176. 
187 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13. 
188 SOCAN, supra note 186, at ¶ 49. The Supreme Court agreed with the Copyright Board of Canada, a regulatory 
body for copyright matters, that “. . . previews satisfy the requirements of fair dealing and that the online service 
providers do not infringe copyright. In so concluding, the Board properly balanced the purposes of the Act by 
encouraging the creation and dissemination of works while at the same time ensuring that creators are fairly 
rewarded”. 
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was no need any longer to make the defendant prove his claim of fair dealing.189 In the actual 
test, the Court considered the factors of the fair dealing test all together.190 Before going 
through the fair dealing factors, the Court adopted an expansive approach to private studies and 
research, and it considered that listening to song previews is a matter similar to such research.191  
After affirming the research aspect of song previews, the Court first looked at the purpose 
factor, which is whether the dealing is made through commercial or non-commercial reasons. 
The Court found that song previews are not downloaded, rather, they are streamed, so there 
was no copying per se. Although the Court found that there are commercial reasons for 
listening to a song preview, such as deciding whether to buy the song or not, it still considered 
that the research aspect of the song previews along with their limited functions or the 
“reasonable safeguards” makes this dealing fair.192  
Second, looking at the character of the dealing, the Court determined that as long as the dealing 
is made with a legitimate purpose, which is research in this case, or that the copy of the 
protected content is not stored after its use, the dealing is deemed fair.193 In this case, even if a 
user listens to a song preview one hundred times, it would still not be stored as a copy on the 
device. Third, the Court addressed the amount of the dealing based on the size of the preview 
 
189 Id. at ¶ 11. The Court emphasized on the point that “CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential part of 
furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act. One of the tools employed to achieve the proper 
balance between protection and access in the Act is the concept of fair dealing, which allows users to engage in 
some activities that might otherwise amount to copyright infringement. In order to maintain the proper balance 
between these interests, the fair dealing provision ‘must not be interpreted restrictively’”. 
190 Id. at ¶ 14. The Court stated that “[t]o assist in determining whether the dealing is ‘fair’, this Court set out 
the following six fairness factors for guidance: the purpose, character, and amount of the dealing; the existence 
of any alternatives to the dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of the dealing on the work”. 
191 Id. at ¶ 30. The Court determined that “. . . in considering whether previews are for the purpose of ‘research’ 
under the first step of CCH, the Board properly considered them from the perspective of the user or consumer’s 
purpose. And from that perspective, consumers used the previews for the purpose of conducting research to 
identify which music to purchase, purchases which trigger dissemination of musical works and compensation 
for their creators . . .”. 
192 Id. at ¶ 35-36. First, the Court referred to the Board’s analysis that “. . . there were reasonable safeguards in 
place to ensure that the users’ dealing in previews was in fact being used for this purpose: the previews were 
streamed, short, and often of lesser quality than the musical work itself. These safeguards prevented the 
previews from replacing the work while still fulfilling a research function”. Then, the Court concluded that “the 
Board’s approach is consistent with CCH’s observation that while research done for commercial reasons may be 
less fair than research done for non-commercial purposes, the dealing may nonetheless be fair if there are 
‘reasonable safeguards’ in place to ensure that the works are actually being used for research”. 
193 Id. at ¶ 37. In the second factor, the character of the dealing, the Court first referred to CCH’s analysis. It 
stated that “. . . the Court also pointed out, if a single copy of a work is used for a specific legitimate purpose, or 
if the copy no longer existed after it was used, this would favour a finding of fairness”. The Court further added 
that “The previews were streamed, not downloaded.  Users did not get a permanent copy, and once the preview 
was heard, the file was automatically deleted from the user’s computer.  The fact that each file was automatically 
deleted meant that copies could not be duplicated or further disseminated by users”. 
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in relation to a complete song; a preview was found to comprise only a  very small part of the 
whole song.194 Fourth, the Court found that the alternative means of accessing a song is to buy 
it with a return guarantee. It considered that paying the full price for a song just to access a 
small part of it does not constitute a reasonable alternative.195 Fifth, the Court followed a similar 
reasoning as in Kelly finding  that these previews actually served as a form of promotion of the 
songs.196 Sixth, the Court criticized the claim of the potential negative effect on the market; for 
the Court, the only way that this factor would matter is through the existence of actual evidence 
that proves an economic harm.197 
D. The UK Fair Dealing 
Fair dealing in the UK also serves the same purpose as the US model of fair use, which is to 
allow for certain copying acts using a particular set of factors. Unlike the US’ model, however, 
the UK model of fair dealing requires the user to prove that the use falls under the enumerated 
list of uses; 198 this, in turn, requires that the use be in accordance with the law, show an 
attribution of the original work, and especially be used for expression.199 After the defendant 
fulfills these three requirements, the courts can then apply the fair dealing test which constitutes 
 
194 Id. at ¶ 39. In the third factor, amount or quantity of the dealing, the Court affirmed the Board’s finding that 
“[t]he Board characterized the ‘amount’ of the dealing in terms of the length of each preview compared to the 
length of the work, concluding that streaming a preview of about 30 seconds was a modest dealing ‘when 
compared to purchasing the whole work  [approximately four minutes] for repeated listening’”. 
195 Id. at ¶ 46. In the fourth factor, alternatives to the dealing, the Court also agreed with the Board’s statement 
that “. . . ‘[l]istening to a preview probably is the most practical, most economical and safest way for users to 
ensure that they purchase what they wish’ . . . As a result, it concluded that short, low-quality streamed previews 
are reasonably necessary to help consumers research what to purchase”. 
196 Id. at ¶ 47. In the fifth factor, nature of the work, “which examines whether the work is one which should be 
widely disseminated”, the Court commented on the plaintiff’s claim that “SOCAN does not dispute the 
desirability of the sale and dissemination of musical works, but argues that since these works are easily 
purchased and disseminated without the use of previews, previews are of no additional benefit to promoting 
further dissemination. But the fact that a musical work is widely available does not necessarily correlate to 
whether it is widely disseminated.  Unless a potential consumer can locate and identify a work he or she wants 
to buy, the work will not be disseminated”. 
197 Id. at ¶ 48. In the sixth and final factor, “the effect of the dealing on the work and whether the dealing 
adversely affects or competes with the work”, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause of their short duration and 
degraded quality, it can hardly be said that previews are in competition with downloads of the work itself.  And 
since the effect of previews is to increase the sale and therefore the dissemination of copyrighted musical works 
thereby generating remuneration to their creators, it cannot be said that they have a negative impact on the 
work”. 
198 This is quite similar to the strict fairness model in the rest of Europe that only follows a list of EPUs in 
determining the fairness of the copying act. 
199 SONG, supra note 14, at 469. 
38 
the nature of the work, method of obtaining the protected content, amount copied from the 
content, purpose of the use, effect on the market, and alternatives to the content.200 
In Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd,201 the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal decided that an extract which had been taken by the defendant from the plaintiff’s TV 
program constituted fair dealing. The Court of Appeal accepted the defendant’s claim for fair 
dealing as the content fell under criticism or review, which can be interpreted under free 
expression.202 Furthermore, the Court noted that the appearance of the plaintiff’s logo on the 
defendant’s copied content is sufficient attribution.203 The main factor that the Court of Appeal 
relied on was the amount copied from the program as it comprised only thirty seconds of the 
whole content.204 
E. Enumerated Permissible Uses (EPUs) 
The EPUs model does not have a fairness test like the ones addressed above. The EPUs model 
is simply a list of the copying acts that are allowed for copyrighted content. Essentially, this 
approach applies an “exhaustive list of exceptions to copyright.”205 This is the reason the 
Google thumbnails and Google Books cases were decided differently compared to the US 
decisions. For instance, in Germany, Google was forced to change the thumbnails of pictures 
into texts that described them, but Google rejected such a solution due to the impracticality of 
the measure.206 However, in 2017, the German Federal Court of Justice found that thumbnails, 
which appear in image results on Google, do not constitute a copyright violation as it is not 
possible for the search provider to check whether each image that shows up in the search results 
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has been legally acquired or not. 207  The Court’s approach in this case reflects the 
reasonableness aspect of copyright measures which can also be found in the Canadian 
copyright cases. 
F. Reasons to Reconsider the Factors of Fair Use/Dealing Doctrine 
The US model of fair use has inspired other courts, such as Canada, to adopt a more expansive 
approach when determining the fairness of copying acts. The clearest aspect of this influence 
is the inclusion of similar factors into the fairness test. For example, the purpose of the dealing, 
found in Canada and UK’s system, is the same as the first factor in the US model of fair use. 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly acknowledges the role of the US fair use 
model in shaping the current fair dealing test.208 The differences are minimal. For instance, the 
fair dealing test has an additional factor among the alternatives to the dealing. Nonetheless, in 
the US fair use model, it is also possible to address alternatives the use during the four-factor 
test. For example, in Sega, the US Ninth Circuit for the Court of Appeals determined that there 
was no other alternative for Accolade to access the Genesis but its “disassembly.”209  
The same resemblances apply to the UK model of fair dealing, except that the courts in the UK 
do not have to consider all of the factors in the test to determine the fairness of the dealing. 
Even in Germany, which follows the much stricter system of EPUs, has started to be more 
practical and seek other interpretations instead of solely relying on the EPUs. However, the 
EPUs system does not offer the means for balancing between authors’ and users’ interests like 
the fair use/dealing test, but this does not mean the latter system does not ignore certain themes 
that the fairness system is built upon. 
1. The Public Benefit Behind the Use 
One of the most essential themes in the cases of software copyright, and copyright in general, 
is the public benefit in acts of software copying. Although the fair use/dealing doctrine does 
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not contain any factor that measures public benefit behind a copying act, courts seek to 
determine pubic benefit when examining the use/dealing as this is ultimately the purpose of 
copyright law in the first place. However, determining the public benefit in software copyright 
cases have often relied on broad interpretations that do not provide clear indications for future 
cases, which is due to the absence of a legal principle capable of weighing such an aspect. The 
reason for such broadness is the technological advancement involved in copying acts, which 
is, for instance, what the US Supreme Court referred to in Betamax.210 The Court noted that 
the new technology which is introduced in Betamax made the interpretation of the Copyright 
Act more difficult, but it did refer to “[t]he immediate effect of . . . copyright law . . . to secure 
a fair return for an `author's' creative labor” and that “the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good” as the “basic principle” that the 
Copyright Act should be construed by.211 Moreover, in Sega, the US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit also referred to the importance of relying on this “basic principle” “[w]hen 
technological change has rendered an aspect or application of the Copyright Act 
ambiguous”.212 
In Betamax, the Supreme Court “acknowledged the public interest in making television 
broadcasting more available.”213 In addition, The Ninth Circuit stated in Sega that it is “free to 
consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact that the 
alleged infringer may gain commercially.”214 It further added that a “[p]ublic benefit need not 
be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a public interest.”215 The 
Ninth Circuit determined that a public benefit is reflected in “Accolade’s identification of the 
functional requirements for Genesis compatibility” which “has led to an increase in the number 
of independently designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis console.”216 
However, the broad interpretations of public benefit did not always guide courts in determining 
such aspect. For instance, in Napster, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“[w]e are at a total loss to find any special circumstances simply because this case requires us 
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to apply well-established doctrines of copyright law to a new technology. Neither do we agree 
with Napster that an injunction would cause great public injury.”217 
The problem with such broad interpretation is that it does not indicate what comprises public 
benefit nor the factors that should determine such an aspect. Taking, for instance, the SOCAN 
case and the broad interpretation that the Canadian Supreme Court adopted for research works 
vis-à-vis song previews, it would be convenient to apply such an approach in Napster, 
especially that when Napster was released there were not so many song previews. Thus, the 
alternative for a user before deciding to buy an album, for example, is to listen to a song through 
Napster in order to make sure that this is the correct one that he or she intends to purchase. 
However, in Kelly, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the “first 
factor weighs in favor of Arriba due to the public benefit of the search engine and the minimal 
loss of integrity to Kelly's images.”218 The Ninth Circuit relied on the transformative character 
of Arriba’s search engine through the showing of thumbnails.219 The Ninth Circuit relied on 
this finding based on a previous case it had decided: Sony Computer Entertainment America v. 
Bleem, LLC (hereinafter Bleem).220  
Bleem was an emulator program that allowed users to play video games that were released on 
the PlayStation platform over their personal computers. The issue in this case was the legality 
of Bleem’s advertisement strategy. Bleem used screen shots to present a comparison between 
PlayStation titles that are played on a computer and the console so that it could demonstrate to 
consumers how the Bleem emulator fared against Sony’s PlayStation. Similar to Kelly, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on the first factor by stating that “[a]lthough Bleem is most certainly 
copying Sony's copyrighted material for the commercial purposes of increasing its own sales, 
such comparative advertising redounds greatly to the purchasing public's benefit with very little 
corresponding loss to the integrity of Sony's copyrighted material.”221 The problem with Bleem 
is that the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the transformative character as it did later in Kelly. 
However, it tacitly employed proportionality in its strict sense when it determined that the harm 
done to Sony’s products is justified by the public’s interest in making "rational purchase 
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decisions" when seeing Bleem’s screen shots that compare playing video games on a computer 
screen to that of a TV. 
The Ninth Circuit also, tacitly, relied on proportionality reasoning in determining whether 
copying a device’s firmware would entail an injunction. In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. 
v. Connectix Corp. (hereinafter Connectix),222 the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of 
whether Connectix’ copying of Sony’s PlayStation firmware was fair use. Connectix’s Virtual 
Game Station is, similar to Bleem, a computer software that functions as an emulator of 
PlayStation’s video games so that users can load these titles on their personal computer. 
Connectix used its software, Virtual Game Station, in copying the BIOS or firmware of Sony’s 
console in order to emulate the functionality of Sony’s PlayStation so that the console’s titles 
would run on a computer. In following the footsteps of Sega, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
fair use defense.223 Concerning the aspect of public interest in this case, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “the downloading infringement, if such it was, would not justify our upholding 
the injunction on the development and sale of the Virtual Game Station . . . Bearing in mind 
the goals of the copyright law, ‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,’. . . 
there is a legitimate public interest in the publication of Connectix's software” and determined 
“that it would be inappropriate to uphold the injunction because of Connectix's copying and 
use of the downloaded Sony BIOS.”224 The Ninth Circuit affirmed that the negative effects 
sustained by Sony did not rise to the level of gravity that would justify halting the development 
of  Connectix's software. 
Therefore, the fair use/dealing factors by themselves do not provide enough guidance in 
determining the public benefit in copyright cases. While it is true that the fairness analysis225 
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does not limit courts to seeking other legal principles, it should not be a habitual performance 
that courts almost always rely on broad or general interpretations when applying the fairness 
analysis. The factors should provide courts enough guidance in software copyright cases in 
order to lower the instances when courts refer to external legal explanations in order to maintain 
the usefulness of the fairness analysis. Courts try to extend the factors to properly consider the 
public interest in copyright cases, but there are cases where the public interest is clear enough 
to be noted, such as the criticism in Pro Sieben.226 On the other hand, even the transformative 
use that courts in the US often relied upon was not enough in some cases. This led courts, such 
as the Ninth Circuit, to tacitly apply proportionality in its strict sense in order to determine 
whether the level of harm faced by the copyright owner would justify banning the defendant, 
and consequently all subsequent acts, from engaging in the copying behavior. 
2. Non-Contributory Factors to the Fairness Analysis 
In some software copyright cases, not only does measuring public benefit become difficult, 
there are also factors that do not provide much help to courts or reveal new findings when 
conducting the fairness analysis. For instance, the Canadian fair dealing splits the first factor 
into two separate steps, purpose and character. The character step sees whether “a particular 
dealing might be unfair if multiple copies of works are being widely distributed,”227 However, 
the fifth factor, nature of the copyrighted work, also “examines whether the work is one which 
should be widely disseminated.”228 These two factors are unproductive.  
First, the character step does not identify the reason for which the wide distribution of copies 
would be unfair, but the Court did state that “a single copy of a work is used for a specific 
legitimate purpose . . . may be . . . a fair dealing”. However, nothing refers to the considerations 
of unfairness in case “multiple copies of works are being widely distributed”. 
Second, the nature of the copyrighted work factor does offer clear indications as to whether the 
protected work should be widely disseminated. The Court does stress the importance of wide 
distribution of research content but has not sufficiently addressed the reason for which a work 
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should have limited distribution. It acknowledges that “if a work has not been published, the 
dealing may be more fair in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a wider 
public dissemination of the work - one of the goals of copyright law. If, however, the work in 
question was confidential, this may tip the scales towards finding that the dealing was 
unfair.”229 The distinction between unpublished and confidential content does not offer much 
in determining the ultimate goal of the factor, which is whether a work should be widely 
disseminated or not. In addition, the Court did not specify the meaning of a confidential work.  
Third, if a work turns out to be one that should be widely disseminated and the dealing involves 
multiple copies that are widely distributed, this arises as to how courts or the Copyright Board 
should address such cases. Most likely the consideration of both factors would end in a draw. 
The character step would favor the plaintiff, while the nature of the copyrighted step would 
favor the defendant.  
Fourth, in both factors, the Court did not define what “wide” dissemination actually entails 
including how large a dissemination would have to be in order to be considered wide. However, 
factors that do not offer much guidance to courts also exist in the US fair use model. 
The four-factor test also includes certain inefficiencies when it comes to fairness analysis. To 
demonstrate, the first factor, which is purpose and character, predominantly matters when the 
character of the use is transformative such as in Campbell,230 Connectix,231 Kelly,232 and 
Google Books.233 Courts do take into account whether the use is for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, but these purposes are often eclipsed by other factors than their 
transformative character, such as in Sega234 and Bleem.235 It is worth noting that the Ninth 
Circuit could have identified the transformative character in Sega because Accolade changed 
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how Genesis interacts with its video games by transforming the device’s object code to source 
code so that it could achieve interoperability between Genesis and Accolade’s titles. The Ninth 
Circuit even explicitly recognizes the transformative aspect when stating the facts by saying 
that “Accolade transformed the machine-readable object code contained in commercially 
available copies of Sega’s game cartridges into human-readable source code using a process 
called ‘disassembly’ or ‘decompilation’.”236 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit could have also considered the screenshots that were taken from 
Bleem as transformative in character. This is because Bleem used the screenshots as a way to 
preview the emulator capabilities compared to Sony’s console, not just for showing imagery 
of a video game. The Ninth Circuit, similarly, considered it in Kelly as it found Arriba’s use of 
thumbnails revealed by its search engine, facilitated users’ access to Kelly’s content.237 While 
this does not reflect the practicality of considering the commercial or non-commercial purposes 
in cases of software copyright, this does prove, however, the influential impact of the 
transformative character, which is considered only in the US fair use model, especially that 
courts commonly link the transformative character of a use to achieve a public benefit, which 
is a primary objective in copyright law. 
Additionally, the second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, also does not provide much 
guidance in cases of software copying. For instance, in Campbell, the US Supreme Court stated 
that “‘the nature of the copyrighted work,’ is not much help in resolving this and other parody 
cases, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”238 
Furthermore, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also followed the Supreme Court’s 
statement regarding the second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, as it had in Bleem. It 
found that the defendant’s screenshots are just still images of content related to Sony,239 so this 
factor favored neither of the parties.240 Thus, the second factor did not contribute to the findings 
of the case.  
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Furthermore, the third factor, amount and substantiality of the used portion, is also not much 
help in software copyright cases, especially that most software copying acts involve the taking 
of a large amount, if not all, of the content. Although the Supreme Court did state in Betamax 
that even copying the totality of the protected work does not negate the finding of fair use,241 
courts were little guided by this factor when interpreted in software copyright cases. For 
instance, in Kelly, the Ninth Circuit determined that the third factor does not apply to  either of 
the parties as Arriba’s copying of the entirety of Kelly’s images was “reasonable” and 
“necessary” in order maintain the utility of the search engine.242 Moreover, in Campbell, the 
Supreme Court was not able to decide on this factor and remanded the case to the lower court 
to equally reevaluate the third factor with the other ones.243 Although Campbell is not related 
to software copyright, it serves as an example of how the amount and substantiality of the used 
portion can also be non-influential in the fairness analysis. 
Finally, this discussion leads us to the fourth factor, which is the effect of use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. Although this factor has proven to be highly 
influential in fairness analysis, especially that the Supreme Court stated that it is “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use,”244 it can also be a less indicative factor when it 
comes to determining real harm to the plaintiff’s market. In Sega, the Ninth Circuit, counting 
the fourth factor in favor of Accolade,245 determined that Sega’s conduct in monopolizing the 
market by restricting access to its Genesis is not within the objectives of copyright law.246 
However, in Napster, the Ninth Circuit found that Napster harmed the plaintiffs by creating 
“barriers” that would hinder their access to the “market for the digital downloading.”247 The 
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wording here differs significantly as the former means that there is deliberate conduct for 
making no room for competition while the latter reflects the opposite. The word “barriers” does 
not apply to Napster as the defendant did not create a certain security measure or firmware that 
would, actually, restrict the plaintiff from directly entering the digital market. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court stated that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair 
use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright”,248 which gives 
other factors less magnitude compared to such transformative works.249  
In Connectix and Kelly, the Ninth Circuit followed suit by affirming that a transformative use 
is not likely to cause a harm to the plaintiff’s market compared to a use that only duplicates the 
original content.250 Moreover, in Connectix, the Ninth Circuit also referred to its finding in 
Sega by stating that “Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play 
games Sony produces or licenses” and that “[t]he copyright law . . . does not confer such a 
monopoly.”251 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the fourth factor on the basis that a use can create 
enriching competition which can prevent the copyright owners from dominating the market, 
hence diminishing other creative works. However, in Google Books, the Second Circuit 
referred to copyright as “a commercial right, intended to protect the ability of authors to profit 
from the exclusive right to merchandise their own work,”252 so when Sony and Sega chose to 
include a certain level of exclusivity in their promotion of their devices, PlayStation and 
Genesis,  it did not interfere with exercising their “commercial right”. For instance, the fact 
that Sony makes some video games exclusively available to PlayStation does not necessarily 
mean that it aims to monopolize the entire video game market through its console.253 Therefore, 
the function of the fourth factor does not indicate whether courts should consider the existence 
 
248 Campbell, supra note 130, at 579. 
249 Id. at 130. 
250 Kelly, supra note 155. In Connectix, supra note 222, at 607, the Ninth Circuit noted the District Court’s finding 
that “’[t]o the extent that such a substitution [of Connectix's Virtual Game Station for Sony PlayStation console] 
occurs, Sony will lose console sales and profits.’ . . . We recognize that this may be so. But because the Virtual 
Game Station is transformative, and does not merely supplant the PlayStation console, the Virtual Game Station 
is a legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and Sony-licensed games can be played”. 
251 Id.  
252 Google Books, supra note 156. 
253 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, however, may reflect the influence of the utilitarian and social planning 
theories in achieving social welfare or an appealing culture by creating a diverse competition, resulted from a 
transformative use, that leads to further creative works. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit’s rational can also point 
towards a Lockean influence in making sure that “there is enough and as good left in common for others”, so 
the Ninth Circuit could have seen in Sony and Sega’s policy of conducting their business that their monopolistic 
attempts will eventually lead to not enough room for others to enter the video games market. 
48 
of fair competition, obstacles created by the contested use that hinder the plaintiff’s access to 
a certain market, or just the net effect of the use on the copyright owner’s financial status. 
Nonetheless, the transformative aspect of a use remains a strong indicator in weighing the 
fourth factor. Even though the Ninth Circuit did affirm in Sega,254 Connectix,255 and Google 
Books256 some financial losses resulting from the defendants’ secondary uses, the 
transformative character of the copying acts gave them a superior value over such losses. This 
further strengthened what the Second Circuit stated in Google Books that the more the use is 
transformative “the more it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public knowledge” and the 
less likely it will diminish “the protected market opportunities of the copyrighted work.”257 
Therefore, it is the transformative character, at least in the US model, that has proven to be the 
single step that influences courts to narrow their interpretations of the other factors and keep 
the fairness analysis focused as much as possible on the ultimate objective of copyright law, 
which is protecting the public benefit. 
3. The One-Sided Balancing of the Fairness Analysis 
The nature of the factors that are applied during analysis which point toward the defendant, 
makes the process of recalibrating these factors to include the plaintiff’s conduct in the 
balancing process quite difficult. It is only the nature of the copyrighted work that can be 
considered as a factor that look towards the plaintiff, but this factor has proven to be 
unproductive as previously discussed. The factor of alternatives to the dealing is somewhat 
neutral between both the plaintiff and the defendant as it looks at the extent of necessity behind 
the dealing. This means that if there is a “non-copyrighted equivalent of the work” or that the 
purpose is not among important objectives, such as research purposes, then the dealing would 
be deemed unnecessary. On the other hand, if there are no substitutes for the protected content 
or if there is a higher cause in making the contested dealing, then it would be considered as 
fair.  
However, the issue in this factor, the alternative to the dealing, is the difficulty, or even the 
unsuitability of making a compilation of works in order to decide whether there is an alternative 
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to the dealing. This is because non-copyrighted content is not formally registered as a protected 
work which increases the difficulty of searching for non-copyrighted works as these works 
would require parties to look through countless sources in order to find a suitable alternative, 
which makes this factor impractical. Furthermore, to determine whether a purpose is significant 
enough to justify the dealing is not quite indicative in the fairness analysis. As previously 
discussed, even if the purpose appears to be noncommercial, it does not hold much weight in a 
way that makes the purpose factor almost weightless during the fairness analysis. Thus, the 
current status of the fair use/dealing test makes the weighing process between the authors’ 
interests against the users’ responsibilities, which in turn makes the defendant the object of 
greater scrutiny compared to the plaintiff. 
For this reason, conducting a balancing process without weighing the interests and 
responsibilities of both copyright owners and users will lead to either an enforced tilting of the 
balancing process in favor of users, such as in Betamax where the Supreme Court favored the 
personal uses of consumers in recording live broadcasts, or to make the test a priori inclined 
towards the plaintiff’s interest, such as in Napster where the Ninth Circuit rejected Napster’s 
claim of space-shifting as it saw that the service involved public distribution. 
In conclusion, the principle of fair use/dealing is important to preserve in the system of 
copyright. However, there are drawbacks in the principle of fair use/dealing that hinder its 
application in cases of software copyright. The next chapter looks at other principles that are 
applied on claims of software copyright infringement in order to find the possible remedies in 
addressing the disadvantages of fair use/dealing and to maintain its advantages.   
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IV. Other Possible Modes of Defenses in Claims of Software Copyright 
Infringement 
There are other legal concepts that are used to determine whether copying is fair or an 
infringement. The most relevant ones in this paper, are originality, technological neutrality, 
and proportionality. The importance of examining other legal principles in the field of 
copyright lies in their effectiveness in solving copyright claims. Although these three principles 
discussed in this chapter are not directly related to fair use/fair dealing, they serve an important 
role in cases of software copyright. For this reason, studying these principles can help in 
addressing the shortcomings of fair use/fair dealing through the observation of wider aspects 
in software copyright. Each of these concepts will be addressed in separate sections following. 
A. Originality 
The concept of originality is known as “the sine qua non of copyright.”258 It means that 
originality is an indispensable condition for earning copyright. The threshold of originality is 
one of the possible defenses that a defendant can opt for in claims of copyright infringement. 
In his work, Paul Goldstein259 wonders about the reason behind the ongoing admiration shown 
by legal experts towards fair use, and not paying attention to other principles that may also be 
beneficial in addressing the complex situations of copyright such as originality.260 In 
Goldstein’s view, the reason for such admiration is the nature of the fair use relationship 
between creators and users’ rights. However, originality can be also considered as a balancing 
tool in its own right because it aims to maintain the equilibrium between the content’s 
originality in securing the creator’s incentives and avoiding excessive restriction measures for 
uncopyrightable content.261 This does not mean, however, that originality is not without its own 
problems. 
 
258 Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
259 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, FAIR USE IN CONTEXT, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 433 (2008). 
260 Id. 434. Goldstein mentioned originality as an example for a potential starting point to formulate a theory of 
copyright as a demonstration on the existence of other legal principles that are also important in the field of 
copyright. By analogy, addressing the issue of fair use/dealing in software copyright should also incorporate an 
examination of other legal principles, such as originality, that serve an important role in cases of copyright 
infringement. 
261 MCJOHN, supra note 108, at 90. Here, Mcjohn refers to the resemblance of the balancing process between 
fair use and originality in achieving the role of copyright law. Therefore, to fix the balancing issues in the fairness 
analysis, one should observe other legal principles, such as originality, that follow a similar balancing function of 
the fair use/dealing doctrine in order to identify the possible advantages of similar legal principles that could 
cover the disadvantages of the fairness analysis. 
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Originality is the essence of any copyright law as it simply determines whether a content is 
eligible for protection under copyright laws or not.262 Throughout the development of 
originality in legal history, the concept is mainly based on the independent creation of a work 
and showing “a modicum of creativity.”263 Therefore, originality is not related to the quality of 
something being new or unusual, rather, it is about showing some sort of self-created work that 
reflects a modest level of creativity.264 In general, and since the threshold of originality is very 
low, courts most often find that any work meets the requirement of originality’s standards.265 
However, in some cases, courts have found that a work which is supposed to be available to 
the public or does not show a certain level of imagination is not original enough, and hence, 
not protected by copyright laws.266 The most important development of the concept of 
originality that caused an impact on cases of software copyright began in the late 1900s.267 
When the term originality was incorporated to US Copyright act of 1976, the Congress did not 
define what the extents and limits of originality were.268 As a result, the task of identifying the 
scope of originality was left to the courts.269 This task was undertaken by the US Supreme 
Court in 1991 in the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co (hereinafter 
Feist).270 The Rural Telephone Service Company is a public utility provider in a small town in 
the state of Kansas that gathered telephone directories of all its customers. Feist Publications 
specializes in gathering telephone directories from many areas within Kansas. Rural discovered 
that Feist had copied many entries from its directory. As a result, Rural filed a lawsuit against 
Feist for copyright infringement. The Supreme Court found that Feist’s act of copying 
telephone records did not constitute an infringement as Rural’s work of compiling telephone 
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records did not reflect a minimum level of creativity, regardless of the work and effort behind 
its creation.271 The Court, however, noted that the facts in themselves, such as names and 
addresses, are not copyrightable, but the compilation of these facts may be protected by 
copyright.272 The Supreme Court reverted to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision as the latter affirmed that Feist had infringed on Rural’s copyright based on the labor 
and effort invested in gathering telephone directories. The Tenth Circuit, and also the District 
Court, affirmed that telephone records are copyrightable works based on the sweat of the brow 
doctrine.273 However, the Supreme Court followed an originality test that is based on the 
independent creation of a work and its fulfilling a certain level of creativity, which Rural’s 
work failed to pass. 
The Feist case is an important part of the foundation for the application of the originality test 
in copyright cases. However, it has caused considerable debate in terms of software copyright. 
In 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the creation of digital wire-
frames274 was not creative enough to be protected by copyright in the case of Meshwerks Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc (hereinafter Meshwerks). 275 The Court stated that the work of 
digital wire-frames did not show independent work or any sort of creativity as Meshwerks only 
copied preexisting Toyota car models.276 Although the Court noted the extensive effort made 
 
271 Id. at 363-364. The Supreme Court found that “[t]he white pages do nothing more than list Rural's subscribers 
in alphabetical order. This arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that 
Rural undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself. But there is nothing remotely creative about 
arranging names alphabetically in a white pages’ directory” as it “. . . does not possess the minimal creative spark 
required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution”. The Court concluded that “Because Rural's white pages lack 
the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement. This decision should not be 
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rewards originality, not effort”. 
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behind making a content, while the latter requires a certain level of creativity without considering the effort 
behind the content’s creation. Therefore, the sweat of the brow’s only standard is that whether the content is 
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274 Wire-frames are designs of shapes without adding shading, colors, textures, and lighting. In the case of 
Meshwerks, the plaintiff designed Toyota car models in the form of wire-frames. The purpose of these designs 
is to create a simulation of Toyota cars so that it can be used as a foundational design, a sketch, for other 
purposes, such as advertisements. 
275 Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc. 528 F 3d 1258 (2008). See PALUMBO, supra note 262, at 144. 
276 Id. at 1270. The Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]he designs of the vehicles . . . owe their origins to Toyota, 
not to Meshwerks, and so we are unable to reward Meshwerks' digital wire-frame models, no doubt the product 
of significant labor, skill, and judgment, with copyright protection. See LEE, supra note 262, at 927-928. 
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by Meshwerks, it rejected the contention that Meshwerks’ designs met the threshold of 
originality.277  
The Meshwerks decision drew strong criticism due to the lack of acknowledgement of the role 
of advanced technology in creating art.278 The decision also reflects the tendency for designs 
which originate in physical form to be more likely considered original compared to works that 
are digitized. However, it is important to introduce a different perspective in this case. Taking 
a step back to the Google Books project that began in 2004 and escalated into a legal dispute 
that ended few years ago,279 one notices that the fair use test, especially the transformative use 
factor, would have considered the design of Toyota cars into digital wire-frames as being fair. 
By applying the same rationale of, at least, transformative use in the case of Google Books or 
the use of thumbnails in Kelly,280 it would result in acknowledging that the act of digitizing 
Toyota car models is the same as Google’s attempt at the digitization of books or Arriba’s use 
of thumbnails that had a lower quality compared to the original photos. Applying the 
transformative factor, the most decisive factor in cases of software copyright, to Meshwerks 
does give some merit to the opinion that fair use should be applied on the plaintiff or those who 
claim the copyright of their work.281 
Originality also witnessed an important development in Europe in 2009.282 In the case of 
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (hereinafter Infopaq),283 the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found that copying words from previous news articles 
in the form of 11-word extracts is subject to copyright protection.284 Infopaq scanned news 
articles, published by Danske Dagblades Forening (DDF), in order to provide its customers 
short extracts of 11-words so that the process of searching for certain articles would become 
more easy.285 It is similar to the Google Books project which aimed to give consumers an easier 
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way to search through the books by providing snippets that resulted from scanning the books.286 
Although the 11-word extracts were also small reproductions, the CJEU found that Infopaq’s 
partial reproduction of DDF’s articles required prior consent. To do this, the CJEU established 
the concept of “free creative choices” in order to determine the originality of the news 
articles.287 The Court concluded that in the case of news articles originality, is reflected in the 
way words are expressed, and such expression is found throughout the entire article which 
makes it fall under the protection of copyright law whether in full copying of all pages of the 
work, or in part, such as the 11-word extracts.288 
In 2010, the CJEU faced another issue related to the eligibility of graphics user interface (GUI) 
to be protected by copyright.289 The Computer Programs Directive protects any expression in 
the form of a computer program under the European copyright law.290 However, in 
Bezpecnostni soflwarovd asociace- Svaz soflwarove ochrany v. Ministerstvo kultury291 
(hereinafter BSA), the Court found that works which result from the functionality of a computer 
program are uncopyrightable.292 This means that a GUI that is a requirement for a computer 
program to function is not an intellectual creation and, hence, not original.293 The BSA case 
shares a similarity with the Meshwerks case as the Tenth Circuit also found that the digital 
wire-frames are not original enough because they draw their existence from pre-designed 
Toyota car models.294 Therefore, the same alternative perspective applied in Meshwerks can be 
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used in the BSA case as transformative use would have changed the outcome of the case. The 
reason is that a GUI transforms the computer program in order to make it useable by its users. 
When a creator produces a work, that content is not fully the author’s creation as it draws 
inspiration and elements from the society.295 Therefore, determining originality should follow 
a mechanism that examines the contribution of the author’s content to the surrounding society, 
not a tool to be limited in determining the originality of the content in relation to the author’s 
creation alone.296 The concept of originality is important in copyright laws as it seeks to identify 
the copyrightable content from the uncopyrightable ones, but it seems that the current 
application of originality in cases related to software copyright reflect the same difficulty of 
applying the balance in the fair use/dealing doctrine. The core drawback in originality is that 
the balancing process points towards the plaintiff only as there are no considerations of what 
the content signifies to the public. Originality on its own is an insufficient legal mechanism to 
determine whether a creation serves as a contribution to the society or not. 
B. Technological Neutrality 
The second principle related to the field of software copyright is the concept of technological 
neutrality. In general, the notion of neutrality appeals to lawmakers as it guides them in 
achieving fairness concerning  many legal issues that requires creating a balance between 
competing rights.297 In the realm of fair use in software copyright, the doctrine does not provide 
a proper neutral zone between regulations set by the law and the access that the law should 
allow.298 This technological gap or the disconnection between law and technology is mainly 
caused by the inability to predict the progress of innovation,299 and this unpredictability cannot 
be solved by enforcing strong copyright protections as they may hinder access to new 
technologies.300 In addition, judicial inconsistency is another factor that increases the gap in 
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the legal relationship between copyright owners and users as there are disputes related to 
similar facts that see different reasonings.301 
For instance, in American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (hereinafter Aereo),302 Aereo 
leased a personal antenna for each subscriber that captured television broadcasts by copying 
the signal and sending it to the user via the internet for time-shifting purposes. The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in upholding the first decision, found that Aereo did not 
participate in copyright infringement as its users had individual antennas for the purpose of 
saving the live broadcast for “private” uses.303 In addition, the Second Circuit also referred to 
a previous case, Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,304 where the Second Circuit also 
found that the defendant did not infringe on the plaintiff’s rights of reproduction and public 
performance of the broadcast.305 However, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Aereo and found that the defendant was liable for infringement on the plaintiff’s 
right of public performance. The Aereo case is also similar to Betamax. Although the majority 
opinion concluded that Aereo does publicly perform the plaintiff’s works, contrary to Betamax, 
the dissenting opinion found otherwise. The dissenting opinion relied on the fact that Aereo 
does not by itself transmit data to a user unless the latter orders it to do so.306 In Betamax, a 
user must get the needed recording equipment in order to copy the live broadcast. Both in 
Betamax and Aereo, individuals must acquire the needed appliances and activate the recording 
process of the live broadcast by themselves. 
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57 
The problem of the unpredictability of technology and the inconsistency of court rulings reflect 
another factor that cannot be predicted which is the way users utilize technology. It is not only 
that lawmakers cannot foresee the future or maintain judicial reasoning, it is also difficult to 
assert the users’ reaction toward a new technology. The problem is that the Copyright Act of 
1976 aimed to be technologically neutral in the sense that it protected the authors’ creations 
and users’ interests regardless of the applied technology.307 For instance, in the Napster case, 
the Ninth Circuit did not take into consideration the role of technology in rendering its decision, 
which is P2P file sharing in this case.308 Rather, it just pointed out that Napster had the 
knowledge that the registered users were engaging in copyright infringement.309 In avoiding 
doing so, the Court of Appeals missed the opportunity to harmonize the relationship between 
copyright owners and users in light of a new technology. 
The current type of neutrality in technological related aspects in software copyright cases is 
not effective enough as the legal boundaries of software copyright are gradually increasing in 
favor of copyright owners, which results in a disproportionate distribution of legal powers 
between copyright owners and users.310 While unfortunate, such tension is not novel in the field 
of copyright. For instance, in the late 1800s, after the emergence of the gramophone and player 
piano, people used these machines to play copied music. The copyright owners of this music 
filed lawsuits claiming copyright infringement, but the Supreme Court found that copied piano 
rolls were not readable by humans, so there was no infringement when the copying of such 
content occurred.311 However, the copyright owners did not give up and presented their 
arguments in front of Congress. There they were successful as the Congress did include 
provisions that extended the term “copy” to “machine-readable copies” in the Copyright Act 
of 1909.312 The revising of the 1909 Copyright Act was not an isolated event as the Copyright 
Act of 1976 has also seen many amendments for technology-related provisions.313  
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In addition, there is also the enactment of the DMCA, which is a regulation related to 
technological aspects.314 However, the over-adoption of specific rules related to technology 
can result in more legal complexities in software copyright as a certain technology that is 
currently regulated may be followed by another one in the future that cannot be governed by 
the current rules.315 Therefore, technological neutrality is best handled as an explicit part of the 
balancing between authors and users, not just as an interpretative principle.316 This prompts 
courts to take the initiative in addressing the technological challenges in claims of infringement 
on the spot instead of waiting for a legislative intervention. It also minimizes the delays and 
the consequences of not dealing with such challenges as early as possible. 
In Canada, the principle of technological neutrality is also receiving major attention.317 It is 
described as a principle “that avoids imposing an additional layer of protections and fees based 
solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user.”318 In ESA,319 the plaintiff 
demanded royalties for songs that were included in video games sold to users as they keep a 
copy of these songs on their devices, even though the publishers of the video games had already 
licensed these songs. The Supreme Court of Canada found that users who obtained these songs 
through the purchase of the video games were not liable for unlawful copying as the principle 
of technological neutrality allows for the production or reproduction of a work in any form.320 
In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers a 
durable copy of the same work to the end user.”321 Thus, users should not be required to pay 
for content delivery made through certain technology. 
If copyright owners have managed to impose extra layers of restrictions, they will not be able 
to counter technological progress as copying attempts will always find their way around these 
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restrictions.322 Therefore, copyright should be looked upon as a system that is crafted to foster 
creativity and the interactions of intellectual skills between community members.323 The ESA 
case is a good example of the application of technological neutrality to the facts of a case. 
Neutrality does not mean non-interference with either the plaintiff or defendant’s conduct, 
rather, it is to show a non-bias towards a particular method of delivery. Technological neutrality 
should ideally be applied in a manner that favors neither plaintiffs nor defendants as its purpose 
is to assure that copyright laws are interpreted in a way “that avoids imposing an additional 
layer of protections and fees based solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end 
user”. By analogy, users should also refrain from using technology in a way that negatively 
impacts the process of dissemination or acquiring revenues over content that belong to the 
copyright owners. Therefore, the principle of technological neutrality can assist courts in the 
balancing process between copyright owners and users in order to determine whether either of 
them has employed technology to harm the other’s interests. 
C. Proportionality 
The third and final concept in addressing the issue of software copyright is proportionality. 
Although there is no explicit application of proportionality in copyright lawsuits, certain cases 
may provide an indication of adopting a proportionality analysis in claims of copyright 
infringement. Throughout the past years, the concept of proportionality has become 
increasingly popular within various legal fields. Generally, the doctrine of proportionality 
emerged more than a hundred years ago.324 Its first use can be traced back to the 1882 Prussian 
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administrative law. It was aimed at restricting the police power doctrine at that time.325 Later, 
the doctrine of proportionality began to be transferred from Germany’s administrative law to 
its constitutional law and expanded further into other states’ regulations, especially within 
Europe.326  
In a more recent era, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) adopted proportionality in 1970 and 1976 respectively. It was further implemented 
after the fall of the Soviet Bloc in the 1990s within the new constitutions of Albania, Moldova, 
and Romania.327 The doctrine of proportionality became a viral legal standard that then spread 
from Europe to many other countries on different continents. Therefore, proportionality is not 
limited to a certain law or to a certain state as it is a transplant from domestic law to 
international law and, most recently, to treaties. Although the implementation of 
proportionality in copyright cases is not yet clear, it still holds an “irresistible attraction”.328 
Proportionality is usually composed of one or more of these factors: legitimacy, suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. Proportionality is also referenced by other terms, 
such as the balancing test, intermediate scrutiny, and reasonableness,329 with all serving the 
same purpose.  
Currently, the role of proportionality in software copyright is not yet clear. However, certain 
theories link proportionality to website blocking injunctions to prevent copyright 
infringement.330 The implicit aspect of proportionality in cases of website blocking injunctions 
appear when courts measure the reasonableness of the infringement act compared to the 
penalty.331 For instance, in Scarlet Extended SA v Société Belge des auteurs, Compositeurs et 
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Editeurs SCRL332 (SABAM), the CJEU held that enforcing a filtering system that monitors all 
the information related to consumers to prevent future infringements is a complicated and 
expensive measure that is not balanced towards protecting IP rights.333 One can infer from this 
court ruling that protecting IP rights should be proportionate to the party’s interests.334 
In Canada, the Supreme Court has not followed a strict proportionality approach, but it has 
started to explicitly apply the standard of reasonableness in decisions of the Copyright Board 
in copyright cases,335 which was referred to in the case of Google thumbnails in the German 
judiciary discussed in the previous chapter. Generally, the Supreme Court reviews the Board’s 
decisions in order to check whether they meet the purpose of the statutes and the interpretations 
of the reviewing courts.336  
In Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 
37 (hereinafter Alberta),337 the Board found that the act of teachers who photocopied short 
excerpts from textbooks for their students for research and study purposes was not fair. The 
Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Board’s decision and the case then moved to the Canadian 
Supreme Court, which decided that the Board’s decision was unreasonable.338 The Court found 
that the Board’s consideration of the separation between teachers and students’ purpose was 
unreasonable as both a teacher and students share the same ultimate goal, which is conducting 
“research/private study.”339 In addition, the Court found that it was unreasonable for the Board 
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to check the relation of all the copied excerpts to the work as a whole in order to determine 
whether the copying was done in fair dealing.340 This is because the amount of the dealing 
factor is not a quantitative assessment, rather, it looks at the relativity between the copied parts 
and the entirety of the original work.341 Moreover, the Court stated that the Board’s finding an 
alternative to the dealing in buying books for each student, instead of copying short excerpts, 
is not a reasonable alternative.342 It is also worth mentioning that buying the original textbooks 
is not an alternative per se, rather, it is the main option to obtain the excerpts, not an alternate 
choice. Lastly, the Court found that there was no evidence that proved the decline in textbook 
sales due to the photocopying act, especially that copies were only short excerpts.343 Thus, the 
Court concluded that the Board’s application of the fair dealing factor was unreasonable. 
There was also a consideration of proportionality, though tacitly, in the application of the US 
fair use model. As previously discussed, the Ninth Circuit, in its decisions in both Bleem344 and 
Connectix,345 relied on equally weighing the financial harm inflicted on Sony with the public 
benefit resulting from the services provided by Bleem and Connectix in offering rational 
purchases and maintaining “public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in 
copyrighted computer software programs.”346 This rationale was adopted in the fourth and last 
factor of the test, which matches the sequence of the proportionality analysis in conducting the 
proportionality in its strict sense as a last step in the balancing process. 
A reasonableness standard requires courts to adopt a rational analysis to determine whether the 
contested act is made through rational conduct.347 On the other hand, proportionality situates a 
court in a position that requires them to weigh between two contested stances with one of them 
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suffering the consequences depending on the court’s decision.348 This is an important 
advantage in proportionality as it constantly alerts the courts that there will be losses and they 
have to realize what is truly at stake in order to determine the decision that will lead to the least 
possible damages. Proportionality is a concept that has seen many applications in different 
jurisdictions. It plays a prominent role in disputes of conflicted rights, such as constitutional 
norms, and balancing between unlawful acts and penalties.349 When seen through the lens of 
software copyright, proportionality appears as a strong candidate for achieving the difficult 
task of measuring the inflicted harm on the copyright owners compared to the public interest 
through the users’ copying acts and the determination of penalties will be less exaggerating. 
In conclusion, the discussed principles in this chapter – originality, technological neutrality, 
and proportionality – provide an indicator towards the possible remedies of the disadvantages 
in the principle of fair use/dealing. The next chapter will present the argument of this paper in 
order to find a balanced mechanism to be applied in cases of software copyright.  
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V. A Shift in Perspective 
The conflict of interests between copyright owners and users requires a different approach that 
considers all the aspects related to owners’ and users’ rights within the context of software 
copying, and at the same time, preserves the purpose of copyright. Such change of perspective 
lead Patterson to argue that fair use as a concept should be applied to the author’s use of work, 
not to limit the consumers’ use of content.350 His reasoning is that when authors create 
something, they copy the work of other authors, so fair use should be applied to the plaintiffs 
to determine whether their work deserves to be immune from copying or not.351 However, if 
fair use, in its entirety, is shifted from being a defense for users to the copyright owner’s use 
of content, it would render the users defenseless.352 This is especially true because copyright 
owners’ rights are well defined in copyright statutes, while users’ interests are not as clear 
compared to copyright owners.353 
The difference between each copyist is that one receives a copyright, while the other enjoys 
fair use/fair dealing. The former is entitled to receive a profit and the latter to apply fair use/fair 
dealing with a duty to reward the authors for their contributions. However, the duty of the 
author is missing from this relationship. Consequently, it is also missing from the balancing 
process altogether. There is an argument that proposes that copyright is, in part, a set of 
privileges, so in Hofheld’s perspective the correlative of a privilege is no-right, which makes 
copyright owners dutyless in relation to users when it comes to their exclusive rights.354 
However, when the Statute of Anne was enacted, publishers, who also own copyright, were 
responsible for distributing nine free copies of the publication to university libraries, and the 
non-execution of this distribution resulted in an imposition of penalties on them.355 In addition, 
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publishers were obligated to maintain reasonable pricing.356 Furthermore, one can infer from 
cases like Connectix and Sega that the Ninth Circuit found that both Sony and Sega went 
beyond their entitlements due to their monopolizing strategies, which can indicate that 
copyright owners have a certain level of responsibility that should not be exceeded towards the 
community at large. Therefore, the idea of a “copy-duty” is not a fiction.357  
There are also other observations that courts can, and should, consider while conducting the 
balancing process. For instance, by looking at Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights the reciprocal rights and duties of users and authors become clear: “[e]veryone 
has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to 
share in scientific advancement and its benefits”, and “that [e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”358 One sees the correlation between the two parts of the 
Article as duty is embedded in both. First, people’s right of free participation is followed with 
a duty to properly reward the authors in respect to their material rights and to protect their 
integrity.359 Second, the right of authors to receive the attribution and fruits of their labor is 
coupled with a duty not to impede the participation of the public in sharing the results of the 
work.360 
The current fair use test or its derivative, fair dealing and EPUs, does not address the authors’ 
conduct. In addition, the test does not reflect the purpose of copyright in the “encouragement 
of learning”361 or to “promote the progress of science and useful arts”362 or “to promote 
technological innovation” and “the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge”, which should be exercised “in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.”363 Allocating the objectives of the doctrine is the most important consideration 
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when applying the test.364 In addition, substituting the drawbacks of the fair use/dealing factors 
with other advantages from different, yet contextually related, principles will provide courts a 
stable framework that they can rely on when examining cases related to software copyright. 
Although principles, such as originality, can have major shortcomings, reconsidering the 
current fair use/dealing factors in the light of these principles can aid courts to continue where 
these principles left off during their fairness analysis. This chapter looks at the connection 
between copyright theories and the application of fair use/dealing in courts of law regarding 
cases of software copyright. Afterwards, the chapter presents a different approach to address 
cases of software copyright based on the findings of this paper. In addition, the proposed 
approach in this chapter is applied on the Napster case as an example of the way it could be 
adopted with. Finally, the chapter closes with possible concerns of the proposed approach and 
the way to address them. 
A. Identifying a Different Approach 
Finding a way to reflect the four theories of property protection in the fair use/dealing principle 
can help in creating a mechanism that captures their common objectives within the context of 
software copyright.365 Balancing between two conflicted interests in software copyright cases 
requires a mechanism that can withstand the rapid change of the system of software copyright 
in order to maintain its reliability in the long term. 
First, there is the social welfare objective which aims at ensuring a wide distribution of 
protected works while also maintaining sufficient incentive for the authors.366 The social 
welfare consideration is essential for courts when applying the fair test, especially in the US.367 
However, none of the factors provide an indication whether a proper incentive is given or that 
wide dissemination has been made.368 The purpose, commercial or noncommercial, and 
character of the use, transformative or not, nature of the copyrighted work, whether 
unpublished or creative work, and the quantity and importance of the used material do not 
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reflect the proper incentive and the wide distribution of the utilitarian approach. Even the 
alternative to the dealing as seen in the Canadian model, does not help either as it simply looks 
into whether there is some other unprotected content that could serve the needs of the 
defendant. As for the effect of use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work, 
it can be connected to the incentive of the author, but it still does not directly indicate what 
constitutes sufficient incentive or how copying may infringe his or her rights, especially that 
the Canadian Supreme Court realized, while reviewing the Board’s decision in Alberta, that 
the impact of making photocopies is “impossible to quantify.”369 
The second theme is related to the Lockean theory of the natural right in obtaining the fruits of 
labor. The difficulties in applying the Lockean approach to the fairness test is also similar to 
the utilitarian one, especially that Locke refers to the one who exhibits labor as a person, not 
an author, so it could also refer to copyists who make transformative works as well. 
The third theme, which is the personality approach, mainly focuses on the personal bond 
between the content and its creator, so from this perspective copyright should be used to 
maximize the interests of authors.370 The only factor that may relate to this approach is the 
nature of the copyrighted work, especially in cases of unpublished content like in Harper.371 
In addition, the EPUs can also reflect the purpose of this approach as it limits copying attempts 
within a fixed list of exceptions in order to protect the rights of the authors as best as possible. 
The fourth and final approach is the one related to maintaining an attractive culture by taking 
into consideration the frequent and benevolent habits of a community in determining the 
fairness of copying acts.372 However, combining this approach with any of the other factors is 
very difficult as none of them reflect the cultural aspect within a community, not to mention 
that it is not an easy task to identify what the usual behavior of consumers is and also to 
determine whether these activities are decent or not. 
The generality of the theories’ objectives combined with the insufficient guidance of the fair 
use/fair dealing test complicates the situation for courts when integrating these objectives with 
the factors of the test  to arrive at  a more unified and fair system.373 In addition, and most 
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importantly, the factors do not reflect the goals of copyright regulation which are the promotion 
of knowledge and information and the wide dissemination of the content. Furthermore, the 
increased gravity of legal remedies in claims of copyright infringement makes the defendant 
reluctant to opt for the fair use/dealing defense as it will not do any good in the face of the 
severe consequences of such lawsuits. 
By relying on other potential principles, namely originality, technological neutrality, and 
proportionality, there could be a multiple-stage analysis that give courts the opportunity to 
examine each party’s conduct one at a time so that they can fully capture the stakes behind the 
actions of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Then, courts could proceed to a neutral stage 
that actively identify and evaluate both parties’ interests and responsibilities so that they can 
determine which party should prevail. Therefore, a shift in perspective is required in order to 
reach a mechanism that is able to detect how the promotion of creative works can be properly 
achieved under claims of fair use/fair dealing. 
B. The Three-Phase Approach 
As explained earlier, the fair use/fair dealing factors do not address the purpose of copyright 
laws. EPUs is a very rigid concept that cannot be adapted to conflicting interests. However, it 
is important to maintain the purpose of copyright and the related theories within changed 
circumstances.374 In 1928, the US Supreme Court found that the government’s wiretapping 
without a warrant does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right of privacy as there 
was no real trespass of the premises of the plaintiff’s house.375 A dissenting opinion decided 
otherwise. It found that the role of courts is to apply the rules in a way that maintain their 
purpose in any given circumstance.376 The dissenting opinion contended that when the framers 
wrote about privacy rights, trespass was the “technology for invading privacy,”377 but times 
have changed and the invasion of privacy can take many forms without physically invading 
someone’s privacy, such as through wiretapping.378 It is the task of judges to not be constrained 
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by the language of copyright statutes in order to reach the needed principles that can make the 
copyright system work for everyone.379  
Shifting to a different perspective, one finds that there are many forms of promoting and 
distributing copyrighted content that did not exist when copyright laws were written. In 
addition, there are now many forms of usage that also did not exist before, so it is important to 
look at the current ways of sharing not to further restrain attempts of copying, but rather, to 
understand how these activities can advance both the interests of copyright owners and users 
in order to preserve the objectives of fairness in software copyright. Consequently, the 
balancing process should explicitly include factors that weigh the interests of both copyright 
owners and users. Therefore, in software copyright cases, the focus should be on the extent of 
fairness in either enforcing an author’s right or legitimizing a user’s copying act. 
C. Roadmap of the Three-Phase Approach and its Benefits 
The three-phase approach is comprised of three stages which are applied together that 
ultimately determine the extent of fairness in favoring either the private interests of copyright 
owners or the public benefit resulting from the defendant’s copying act. The first stage is to 
check the level of transformativeness of the use. The aim of this test is to determine whether 
the use has a minimal level of transformativeness. The purpose of this stage is to maintain the 
aspect of thriving culture through encouraging users to be creative even in the modest of ways. 
In addition, it is to allow users to create their own personal bond with the content they use 
through the demonstration of their own intellectual skills in their act of labor.  
In the second stage, the court would determine the contribution of content and alternate modes 
of dissemination. The aim of the second stage is to determine whether the copyright owners 
have properly promoted and distributed their content by showing “meaningful work”380 that is 
published as widely as possible. This stage also focuses on the personal bond in the relation 
between the creators and their act of labor or content. The contribution factor is not to prove 
the content’s novelty or originality’s independent creation and modicum of creativity, rather, 
it is to show the meaningfulness of the work through the authors’ purpose behind their 
creations.381 Identifying a purpose of creation is an important step in encouraging creators to 
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strengthen the personal bonds with their works because creating content without having a clear 
purpose can slow the production of new content. In the case of works that do not reflect a 
personal bond or a clear purpose, copying may reinvigorate such creations in order to keep 
them active and not forgotten so that a community can maintain a prospering culture. Second, 
the factor of alternate modes of dissemination is aimed at preserving social welfare through 
ensuring the widest possible distribution of copyrighted content so that a society will not be 
isolated from authors’ creations and to have a wide array of accessing options. This factor 
examines the protected content level of accessibility, so if the content is proved to be relatively 
easy to obtain, then the copying act may be considered as an infringement. However, if the 
content is available through limited means, then the copying act may be considered as fair use. 
The third and final stage is composed of two additional factors which are technological 
neutrality and proportionality stricto sensu. These two factors favor neither of the parties as their 
objective is to balance between them. First, technological neutrality is employed to investigate 
whether the copyright owners have used technology to impose extra measures for accessing or 
using the content such as in the ESA case, or that users are taking advantage of technology to 
disrupt distribution plans, harm the personal bond or to avoid providing incentives to creators, 
such as exploiting a technological flaw in obtaining copyrighted content without rewarding its 
creators.382 For example, Electronic Arts, a video games publisher, encountered a flaw in its 
store system that allowed users to use discount coupons indefinitely, which many users did and 
obtained many games by taking advantage of a technological flaw. In this incident, users 
engaged in a direct infringement through the exploitation of an unfair technological advantage. 
Technological neutrality should take an extra step in ensuring the proper dissemination of the 
copyrighted content. At the same time, it seeks to guarantee that users are not utilizing 
technology to prevent rewarding creators the fruits of their labor. Second, proportionality in its 
strict sense is applied in order to weigh between the inflicted harm on the plaintiffs compared 
to protecting the public interest through the users’ copying acts.383 In addition, it determines 
the proportionate remedy based on the outcome of the case. This stage attempts to achieve an 
absolute balance between copyright owners and users. 
 
382  Erik Kain, EA Accidentally Gives Away Free Games With Origin Store Coupon Glitch, available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/10/14/ea-accidentally-gives-away-free-games-with-origin-store-
coupon-glitch/#3389dad31fae. 
383 See GORDON, supra note 365, at 1619-1620. 
71 
1. First Stage of the Three-Phase Approach: Transformativeness 
The first factor in the three-phase approach is transformativeness. If minimal creativity is 
sufficient to obtain a copyright protection, then it should also be enough for a copyist to show 
a minimum level of transformativeness in his/her use in order to be considered as fair. One of 
the most, if not only, decisive factors in cases of software copyright is whether the copying act 
is transformative.384 The reason is that transformative use shows a certain level of creativity of 
a user. It encourages users to become more active within a community,385 which is similar to 
what Lord Hardwicke in Gyles stated that as long as copied content is not “colourably 
shortened”,  then “abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because . . . the 
invention, learning, and judgment of the [secondary] author is shewn in them,” which can relate 
to the condition of the use having some level of transformativeness. In this first stage, a court 
would examine the transformative use of the defendant, while the latter needs to demonstrate 
the transformative aspect of his/her use.  
This draws upon the approach of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit regarding the 
qualification of derivative works to copyright protection, so not just to be considered as fair 
use/dealing, that it should require, similar to the originality test, “some minimal degree of 
creativity.”386 By applying the same rationale to transformativeness, considering a use or 
dealing to be fair should also require a low level of creativity. The reason is that granting 
copyright protection for derivative uses has a much higher value compared to finding them as 
fair, so requiring a low level of creativity in obtaining copyright protection while not doing so 
in considering the transformative character in fairness claims is disproportionate. Therefore, 
both transformativeness and originality should equally require a low threshold of creativity. It 
is even more convenient that transformativeness should require a lower or simplified threshold 
of creativity as the claim in this case is related to a fairness claim, which has a lower legal value 
compared to granting a copyright protection for similarly low value creative works. 
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2. Second Stage of the Three-Phase Approach: Promotion and Dissemination 
The second stage of the three-phase approach consists of two steps that concern the promotion 
and dissemination of copyrighted content. The first step is contribution. Here, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate the meaningfulness aspect of the claimed content towards their recipients. The 
second step is alternate modes of dissemination. It aims to identify whether the copyright owner 
has viable alternate measures to distribute the content to the public.387 This step should not be 
confused with the alternative to the dealing factor from the Canadian fair dealing model. 
a. Contribution 
The main difference between fair use and copyright infringement is the equilibrium of what 
the author dedicates to the society compared to his/her fruits of labor in order to determine the 
fairness of copying acts in relation to the public.388 In addition, copyright grants the creator 
certain exclusive rights, which are not perpetual, and given in exchange for a dedication.389 In 
this way originality is a mandatory step to obtain a copyright, but to measure the significance 
of this originality on a community is something else entirely. For example, in a song called 
Hotel California performed by the Eagles, the band told a story of “materialism and excess” in 
American culture.390 Such work reflects a personal bond between the band and its song that 
makes it a clear contribution to their audience.  
A society expects a contribution in exchange for a reward, so if there are copying attempts 
without reward to the author, then courts should be prompted to examine the purpose of the 
plaintiff’s work dedicated to consumers. Thus, the plaintiff should demonstrate the 
“meaningful” aspect of the work.391 
 
387 FISHER, supra note 34, at 1774. 
388 WALTER PFORZHEIMER, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND FAIR USE, Columbia University 
Press, 30 (1941). Pforzheimer mentioned professor Ralph R. Shaw’s statement in his book Library Property in 
the United States which said that “[t]he differentiation between fair use and infringement is fundamentally a 
problem of balancing what the author must dedicate to society in return for his statutory copyright – which 
varies according to the work involved – against undue appropriation of what society has promised the author in 
terms of protection of his exclusive right . . . fair use is all use dedicated to the public by the nature of statutory 
copyright”. 
389 Id. at 28. Judge Learned Hand stated that “[c]opyright in any form, whether statutory or at common law, is a 
monopoly; it consists only in the power to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work . . . Congress 
has created the monopoly in exchange for a dedication, and when the monopoly expires the dedication must be 
complete”. 
390 Songfacts, Hotel California by Eagles, available at https://www.songfacts.com/facts/eagles/hotel-california.  
391 FISHER, supra note 34, at 1746-1747. 
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b. Alternate Modes of Dissemination 
After the first step, the court moves to examine whether the plaintiff has a viable and widely 
used alternate mode of dissemination.392 The purpose of this step is to examine whether the 
plaintiff has provided a distribution method that can be easily accessed. If the plaintiff’s 
distribution system offers versatility in accessing the content, then this step will most likely 
favor the plaintiff. However, if the plaintiff had an alternate mode of distribution that could 
have been easily adopted, then this step will probably not be in favor of the plaintiff.  
This approach is more efficient than the fair dealing requirement of alternatives to the dealing 
as it provides a manageable criterion for courts to determine whether the plaintiffs have done 
their part as best as possible in encouraging users to obtain the protected works through 
multiple channels, which is easier and more accurate compared to finding a substitute for the 
copyrighted work that could meet the needs of the defendant. 
3. Third Stage of the Three-Phase Approach: Active Balance 
The last stage is based on actively balancing between the interests of copyright owners and 
users. The aim of this phase is to examine both sides of the case and to determine which side 
has an excess of advantages and to recalibrate this superiority in favor of the other party in 
order to achieve a proper balance between the plaintiff and the defendant. The first step in this 
stage is technological neutrality which aims to confirm whether the plaintiff has used 
technology to facilitate or impede the defendant’s access to the content and if the defendant 
has employed technology to avoid paying the cost of using the work or to damage the process 
of dissemination.393 The second and final step is proportionality stricto sensu. The last step is 
for both facts and remedies of the judgment.  
This step examines whether the effect of the copying act on the plaintiff’s rights justifies 
achieving a public interest through the defendant’s act or not. The consideration of a public 
interest comes from the fact that for many consumers in various cultures entertainment 
activities, including music, films, and video games have become an indispensable part of their 
daily lives. This justifies the addressing of sharing and recording software content as an 
 
392 See SHAHSHAHANI, supra note 353, at 282. 
393 See supra note 316 and accompanied text. 
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industry that is connected to a public interest.394 Afterwards, and in determining the required 
remedies, the court could apply proportionality to see whether a property or liability rules that 
is applicable or whether it is a mixture between them. 
a. Technological Neutrality 
In the beginning of the final stage, the court addresses the technological neutrality of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. In this step, the court examines whether the plaintiff has used 
technological measures which facilitate or impede consumers’ usage of the content. In addition, 
the court also investigates the defendant’s utilization of technology to determine if there have 
been attempts to avoid giving the copyright owners the fruits of their labor or to hinder the 
distribution of plaintiff’s work. 
b. Proportionality Stricto Sensu 
In the second step of the third stage and the final factor in the three-phase approach, the court 
considers proportionality in its strict sense seeking to measure the effect of the copying act on 
the plaintiff’s interests compared with achieving a public interest through the defendant’s act. 
The outcome of this step is based on the overall findings of the previous factors. For instance, 
if the plaintiff’s interest will be moderately affected if at all by the defendant’s use that serves 
a public interest, then the defendant’s use will not be considered as infringement.395 
In this case, the use will continue to occur and without the paying of damages. On the other 
hand, if there is a considerable harm to the promotion and dissemination of the plaintiff’s work, 
then the court should consider the significance of the defendant’s act on the public interest. If 
there is a tie between the two sets of interests – the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s – then the 
court should allow the defendant’s use while paying damages to the plaintiff. If, however, there 
is considerable harm to the plaintiff’s work by the defendant’s use in a way that results in 
damage to the public interest, such as not providing a safe environment for promoting and 
disseminating intellectual creations, then the court would order the defendant to refrain from 
such use along with paying damages to the plaintiff.  
 
394 FISHER, supra note 33. 
395 See also GUIDO CALABRESI, ET. AL., PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND INALIENABILITY: ONE VIEW OF 
THE CATHEDRAL, 1115-1116 (1972). In this article, the authors demonstrate the possible legal remedies in the 
example of pollutant emission caused by one neighbor to another one, which are similar to the ones presented 
here. 
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D. Application of the Three-Phase Approach 
In this section, the three-phase approach will be tested on A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster. The 
case is based on whether users’ activity in downloading music files from Napster without 
paying is unlawful access to these works and if Napster is involved in a contributory 
infringement by facilitating the users’ access to music files.396  
In applying the first stage of the test, the copying acts made through Napster are not 
transformative, rather, they serve as sharing the content between users of Napster. Although 
Napster users relied on providing MP3 files, which are transformed from the original music 
files in order to provide smaller file sizes with lower qualities, the claim is based on the sharing 
of the files themselves, not the transformation to MP3 files. Thus, the transformativeness stage 
is not in favor of Napster. 
Moving to the second stage, the plaintiffs provided in their defense that Napster allowed the 
sharing of “hit songs” that the plaintiffs relied on for their sales. In addition, there were many 
other songs that were expected to be major successes due to their popularity amongst 
consumers. Therefore, a contribution can be inferred in this respect. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that a plaintiff cannot raise, in general, a collective claim for all the available content 
provided on a platform. A contribution is not a random aspect of creation, which means that 
plaintiffs should be specific about the exact content the claim is being based on in order to 
determine the contributory aspect of their works. In the second step, the plaintiffs explained 
that they had contracted with many digital distribution services that would provide digital 
access to many songs. However, most of these distribution services were not yet active, and 
the planned release of most of these services was scheduled for mid-2000. On the other hand, 
Napster was released in mid-1999 as a form of digital distribution and, most importantly, was 
already well-accepted by many consumers. Moreover, the plaintiff did not provide any 
evidence that Napster had refused contracting with the plaintiffs to provide a mutual 
distribution system. Therefore, the plaintiffs ignored an obvious alternate mode of 
dissemination at a time when digital distribution of music files did not widely exist. 
In applying the third and final stage, there were no extra measures taken on the plaintiffs’ side 
that would have hindered or obstructed the function of the defendant’s service. On the other 
 
396 Napster, supra note 28. 
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hand, the defendant did not employ Napster to prevent users from paying the costs of the shared 
music files as the service was initially a tool to facilitate the sharing of these files. In addition, 
Napster is not a service that disrupts other digital distribution services, rather, it is a separate 
P2P service that operates in isolation from other publishing platforms. Therefore, both the 
plaintiffs and the defendant are equal in terms of technological neutrality as there are no 
irregularities found on either side of the case.  
After considering all the findings of each factor, it is time to weigh the harm inflicted on the 
plaintiffs on the one side and the public interest in using the Napster service on the other. The 
plaintiff’s main arguments against the defendant are that Napster’s allowing the sharing of 
music files without payment or prior permission from the copyright holders would disrupt plans 
for dissemination conducted with several digital publishing services, and the decline of album 
sales due to the free sharing of music files, especially within the demographic of college 
students. On the other hand, Napster’s main defense was its providing a more convenient means 
of sharing music files between individuals and giving users an opportunity to judge which 
music works might be later purchased. Although Napster did allow the sharing of music files 
without paying for them and without authorization, linking such usage with the decline of 
album sales is not definitive. The plaintiffs’ claim that users would not buy the music albums 
if they had listened to them for free on Napster is not a decisive indicator to justify the sales 
decline, especially with the scarcity of digital distribution services.  
Therefore, under this approach, Napster did allow its users to share music files for free and 
without permission from the copyright holders. However, given the scarcity of digital 
distribution services and the wide acceptance of users to Napster, the defendant can continue 
its services without paying damages. 
E. Concerns Over the Three-Phase Approach 
While a concern may arise that such an approach would increase judicial activism in 
determining the fairness of use in copyright, copyright involves many judge-made principles 
such as the fair use/fair dealing doctrine already. In addition, the development of this doctrine 
was made through the legal interpretations of courts. Therefore, courts, despite the 
inconsistencies, are the most capable of addressing the gaps in cases of software copyright. 
Another concern relates to whether such an approach fits in all cases of copyright or just 
intangible works. However, the three-phase approach does not include factors exclusively 
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related to software. Even the technological neutrality is not just related to software as there are 
many evolutions made to the accessing of non-software protected content. For all of these 
reasons the proposed approach is a way to present the possibility of applying an alternate 
mechanism in the current and future context of copyright cases. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The current complexities of software copyright cases are only “snippets” of future 
ramifications. Many communities rely on advanced technology to access knowledge and 
information, and as time passes it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to abandon the 
advanced tools in accessing different content. It is unknown how technology will develop in 
the coming years and to what extent it will change how copyright works. However, Jacques 
Ellul gives us an idea of how to think about this aspect:  
Knowledge will be accumulated in ‘electronic banks’ and transmitted 
directly to the human nervous system by means of coded electronic 
messages. There will no longer be any need of reading or learning 
mountains of useless information; everything will be received and 
registered according to the needs of the moment. There will be no 
need of attention or effort. What is needed will pass directly from the 
machine to the brain without going through consciousness.397 
This statement was made several decades ago, and Ellul’s prediction of knowledge banks came 
to be true, and there is no telling whether the rest of his prediction will also happen. However, 
from the perspective of this paper, if copyright protections extend their reach to cover every 
aspect of access to knowledge and information, then acquiring any detail and the control of its 
dissemination will face many restrictions. It is for this reason that preserving the purpose of 
copyright through translating its provisions in the current context is an important task for courts 
in order to avoid the excessive restricting measures of copyright now and in the future. 
 
397 RONALD TULLEY, IS THERE TECHNE IN MY LOGOS? ON THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE IDEOGRAPHIC 
TERM—TECHNOLOGY, The International Journal Technology, Knowledge & Society, 4, 1, 102 (2008). 
